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WHO IS ANDREA YATES? A SHORT STORY ABOUT INSANITY
DEBORAH W. DENNO*
INTRODUCTION
We all know by now the story of Andrea Yates. Or, at least we think we do.
Andrea Yates, high school valedictorian, swim team champion, college gradu-
ate, and registered nurse married Russell (“Rusty”) Yates in 1993 after a four-
year courtship.  Both were twenty-eight.1 Over the next seven years, Andrea2
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1. See generally SUZY SPENCER, BREAKING POINT (2002) (providing a journalist’s detailed ac-
count of Andrea’s life, marriage, and competency hearing based upon courtroom observations as
well as many hours of interviews with Rusty and key players in the Yates case); Timothy Roche, The
Yates Odyssey, TIME, Jan. 28, 2002, at 44 (offering one of the most thorough descriptions available of
Andrea’s life and mental breakdown based on forty hours of conversation with Rusty, interviews
with Andrea’s family and friends, an examination of the Yates family home videos, and a study of
“thousands of medical records, police files, autopsy reports and court documents”). For a sampling
of recent commentaries discussing the Andrea Yates case in the context of a wide range of subjects,
including the law and literature on postpartum psychosis, see Catherine Albiston et al., Feminism in
Relation, 17 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 14-15 (2002) (reviewing Michelle Oberman’s analysis of Andrea’s
intense “maternal isolation” and the reasons for Andrea’s narrow perception of the options available
to her); Elizabeth T. Bangs, Disgust and the Drownings in Texas: The Law Must Tackle Emotion When
Women Kill Their Children, 12 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 87, 87 (2001) (reviewing THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Su-
san A. Bandes ed., 1999) (analyzing the importance of emotion in how both the law and society re-
sponded to the Yates case and emphasizing “that the more appropriate emotional response for the
legal system is compassion rather than disgust” in cases involving maternal infanticide)); Joan W.
Howarth, Executing White Masculinities: Learning From Karla Faye Tucker, 81 OR. L. REV. 183, 218-19
(2002) (noting the significance of gender when comparing the Karla Faye Tucker death penalty case
with the Andrea Yates case); Michele Connell, Note, The Postpartum Psychosis Defense and Feminism:
More or Less Justice for Women?, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 143, 145 (2002) (contending, in light of the
Yates case, “that a legislative solution creating a separate postpartum defense is the only way to ar-
rive at equal justice for mothers who commit filicide while suffering from postpartum psychosis”);
Connie Huang, Note, It’s A Hormonal Thing: Premenstrual Syndrome and Postpartum Psychosis As
Criminal Defenses, 11 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 345, 345 (2002) (examining a range of female
hormonal defenses and suggesting that postpartum depression and psychosis “should be allowed as
a type of insanity defense, but not as a separate defense”); Sandy Meng Shan Liu, Comment, Postpar-
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gave birth to five children and suffered one miscarriage, all the while plunging
deeper into mental illness.3 Then on June 20, 2001, in less than an hour, Andrea
drowned all of her children in the bathtub, one by one.4 Months later, she was
convicted of capital murder in Harris County, Texas,5 where she now serves a
life sentence.6
Some may think that a mentally ill mother who committed such an act
should be judged insane. Yet, news accounts and court records suggest that An-
drea impaired her attorneys’ efforts to plead insanity.7 Such defense plans were
already encumbered by the unusually strict Texas insanity standard8 and the
state’s renowned retributive culture.9 After a jury found Andrea competent to
stand trial,10 she resented the efforts that her attorneys mounted on her behalf11
even as she faced possible execution.12 Andrea insisted there was nothing wrong
with her mind13 and that she deserved to die.14 She seemed to be awaiting pun-
ishment for her sins.
To those closest to Andrea, this self-blaming reaction came as no surprise.
They could testify that Andrea had been tormented by bouts of mental illness,15
tum Psychosis: A Legitimate Defense for Negating Criminal Responsibility?, 4 SCHOLAR 339, 349 (2002)
(providing a thorough overview of the law and literature on insanity and postpartum psychosis and
suggesting, in light of the Yates case, changes to the burden of proof in the defense of postpartum
psychosis “or considering such a defense as a mitigating factor at sentencing, if not both”).
2. For purposes of clarity, this Article generally calls the eight members of the Yates family by
their first names only (Andrea, Russell (“Rusty”), Russell’s mother (Dora), and the five children).
3. See infra Appendix 1 at 61: Timeline of Andrea Yates’s Life and Trial: April 1993-April 2002
[hereinafter App. 1] (chronicling critical dates and details concerning Andrea’s problems with men-
tal illness).
4. See id. (June 20, 2001) at 70.
5. See id. (Mar. 12, 2002) at 74.
6. See id. (Mar. 18, 2002) at 75.
7. Associated Press, Yates’ Fate Hinges on Doctors’ Words, Feb. 25, 2002, available at http://www.
courttv.com/trials/yates/022502_ap.html (noting Andrea’s declaration that she “deserve[d] to be
punished” due to her self-proclaimed guilt as one manifestation of what Andrea’s attorneys referred
to as her “self-defeating attitude” resulting from her “severe mental illness”).
8. See Christopher L. Tritico, Real Culprit in Yates Case Is the System, 18 TEX. LAW. 39, 39 (Apr. 1,
2002); infra Part II.B. The Texas Insanity Standard.
9. See, e.g., infra notes 180, 511 and accompanying text. For an excellent overview of the litera-
ture on the subculture of violence inherent in the South and how it relates to the use of the death
penalty, see Carol S. Steiker, Capital Punishment and American Exceptionalism, 81 OR. L. REV. 97 (2002);
see also ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 217-45 (2000) (providing a
pointed discussion of how “culture” affects cases).
10. See App. 1 (Sept. 22, 2001) at 72. For a summary of the psychiatric testimony at Andrea’s
competency hearing and other expertise regarding competency in cases of postpartum psychosis, see
infra Part VI.D., Andrea Yates’s Competency, and accompanying notes.
11. See infra Part VI.D., Andrea Yates’s Competency.
12. See infra note 479 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 74-79, 513-14 and accompany-
ing text (noting the high rate of executions in the South generally as well as Texas and Harris County
more specifically) and notes 430, 528-33 and accompanying text (discussing Andrea’s desire to be
executed).
13. See infra notes 523-33 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 26, 38, 429-31 and accompanying text.
15. See App. 1 (June 17, 1999; July 2-19, 1999; Mar. 31, 2001) at 62-63, 67-68.
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and, in fact, both the prosecution and defense agreed that she was mentally ill.16
Andrea’s life was also distinguished by religious obsession and a steadfast de-
votion to tales of sin and Scripture,17 a “repent-or-burn zeal”18 that led her to be-
lieve she was a bad mother with ruined offspring.19 According to Andrea, she
killed her children to save them from Satan and her own evil maternal influ-
ences,20 delusions that did little to help Andrea’s defense because they fueled her
own desire for punishment.
Public opinion on the Yates killings helps explain some of the more contra-
dictory themes in the case. On the one hand, the public had much sympathy for
Andrea and the life that she led.21  Yet, her composed behavior on the day she
killed her children stirred a strong retributive response.22 Many were unable to
comprehend such violence except by declaring it intentional and evil.23  Ac-
cording to this view, it could be said that Andrea was supremely sane—her acts
rational and premeditated24—despite her unquestioned history of postpartum
psychosis.25 Andrea propelled this account, spurring the public, her “jury,” to
see her as the Satanic mother she believed herself to be.26
16. See Tritico, supra note 8, at 39 (“Everyone agreed that Yates suffers from a mental illness. In
her punishment phase final argument, prosecutor Kaylyn[n] Williford called it a ‘severe mental de-
fect.’”).
17. See infra notes 240, 290-97 and accompanying text.
18. Roche, supra note 1, at 48.
19. See infra notes 296, 380-82 and accompanying text.
20. Trial of Texas Mother Begins Third Week, CNN.COM, Mar. 4, 2002, available at http://www.
courttv.com/trials/yates/030402_cnn.html (quoting the defense expert witness’s opinion that An-
drea believed herself to be Satan, and thought that by drowning her children she was saving them
from hell); see App. 1 (Mar. 1, 2002) at 73.
21. See SPENCER, supra note 1, at 147-48, 215-16; Liu, supra note 1, at 345; Janelle Brown, Swift
Injustice, SALON.COM, Mar. 13, 2002, at http://archive.salon.com/mwt/feature/2002/03/13/yates_
reacts/; Associated Press, Groups Support Mother Who Drowned Children, Other Women Suffering Post-
partum Depression, Aug. 27, 2001, available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/news/2001/0827/
yates_ap.html.
22. See Liu, supra note 1, at 345 (citing news accounts of the Yates case indicating that some
viewed “postpartum psychosis as a contemptible excuse” engineered to evade criminal responsibil-
ity).
23. See id. at 377.
24. See Sherry F. Colb, The Andrea Yates Verdict: A Nation in Denial About Mental Illness,
FINDLAW’S WRIT, Mar. 27, 2002, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/colb/20020327.html (noting that
many people doubted Andrea Yates was insane when she killed her children because she “planned
her actions carefully” before the killings, her actions “seemed efficient and unrelenting” at the time
of the killings, she appeared composed and rational after the killings, and she understood that she
had killed her children and that the act was unlawful).
25. See Gerald E. Harris, Psychological Report on Competency Status (Aug. 30, 2001) (on file
with author)  (stating that Andrea’s “family history is positive for mental illness, with her father and
two siblings reportedly having significant mental disorders,” and that Andrea “also has a personal
history of significant mental problems, including severe postpartum depression, psychotic episodes
and suicide attempts”); App. 1 (June 16-18, 1999; Mar. 13-30, 2001) (detailing episodes of Andrea’s
postpartum depression and postpartum psychosis) at 62, 67.
26. Roche, supra note 1, at 50 (reporting that after Andrea’s arrest, she described the killing of
her children as “a mother’s final act of mercy” and told doctors that “[o]nly her execution would res-
cue her from the evil inside her”); see also Associated Press, Yates Claimed She Killed Kids to Keep Them
from Going to Hell, Mar. 1, 2002, available at http://www.courttv.com/trials/yates/ 030102_pm.html
DENNO.DOC 09/29/03  9:55 AM
4 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 10:1 2003
These complex and conflicting aspects of the Yates case fed into the prose-
cution’s depiction of Andrea’s mental state on the day she killed her children.
But, one psychiatrist’s testimony seemed to have a greater impact than the oth-
ers on the case’s outcome.27 The prosecution’s star expert, Park Dietz,28 appeared
particularly adept at persuading the jury to accept the prosecution’s assertion
that Andrea was sane and acting intentionally when she killed her children.29
Because the Yates case is on appeal, many of the court records are not available.30
In addition, the defense team still lacks funds to pay for the entire trial tran-
script31 so it too cannot be examined. Park Dietz’s testimony, however, is now
accessible32 and it warrants a thorough analysis in its own right.
(stating that Andrea “said she believed that if she killed her children, the state would execute her,
Satan would be eliminated from the world and the children would be saved”).
27. This Article focuses primarily on Dr. Park Dietz as an expert witness, since his testimony is
considered to have been most significant to the outcome of the case. See infra notes 148-49, 153 and
accompanying text. However, the testimony of other expert witnesses for the prosecution, such as
Dr. Harry Wilson (a pediatric pathologist who testified that four of the children were alive but un-
conscious when Andrea removed them from the bathtub and placed them on the bed), also influ-
enced jurors. See Alan Bernstein & Leigh Hopper, Acquittal Not Equal to Free for the Insane, HOUS.
CHRON., Mar. 13, 2002, at A29; see also Terri Langford, Juror: Yates Betrayed by Calm, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Mar. 18, 2002, at 1A.
28. See infra Appendix 4 at 97: Portions of Prosecuting Psychiatrist Park Dietz’s Testimony in
the Andrea Yates Trial [hereinafter App. 4].
29. See App. 1 (Mar. 7, 2002) at 74.
30. See Telephone Interview with Scott Durfee, General Counsel, Harris County, Tex. District
Attorney’s Office (Sept. 5, 2001) (explaining the limits on his office for releasing briefs and other in-
formation because the Yates case is on appeal). Because the entire trial transcript is not available for
the Yates case, see infra note 31 and accompanying text, this Article must rely on news reports and
popular literature to acquire factual information. This method of relying on media accounts to ana-
lyze trials has a long history. See MURDER MOST FOUL AND OTHER GREAT CRIME STORIES FROM THE
WORLD PRESS 1 (Rob Warden & Martha Groves eds., 1980) (providing a collection of forty-seven
crime stories covering 189 years (from 1788 to 1977) because not only is “[c]rime . . . a staple of the
newspaper business,” most significantly, “it is also history” and records the social and cultural reac-
tions to law breaking across different eras).
31. Brenda Sapino Jeffreys, State of Mind, 18 TEX. LAW. 36, 36 (Dec. 23, 2002) (noting that An-
drea’s attorney, George Parnham, “wants to appeal the verdict, but the defense team hasn’t been
able to come up with all of the money to pay for a transcript of the trial”); see also Paying for Yates, 17
TEX. LAW. 3, 3 (June 10, 2002) (explaining that “[o]ne of the challenges of appealing the Andrea Yates
verdict has been securing a transcript of the entire trial—expected to total about 12,000 pages and
cost approximately $50,000—which Yates’ defense attorney . . . says will take the court reporter four
or five months to transcribe”). Although George Parnham, Andrea’s attorney, had asked for a hear-
ing to establish Andrea’s indigent status so that she could acquire a free copy of the transcript, he
subsequently withdrew this request after entering an agreement with the court reporter and a finan-
cial donor. Carol Christian, Yates Accord Set: Lawyer Drops Indigent Request, HOUS. CHRON., May 31,
2002, at A38.  According to Parnham, “I did not want to put [Andrea], quite frankly, through the rig-
ors of being placed on the witness stand. . . . She is ill, and she is sad, and we have found a way to
pay for the transcript.” Paying for Yates, supra, at 3.
32. See generally App. 4.  Fordham University School of Law purchased the entire transcript of
Park Dietz’s testimony (which is on file with the author), for $307.50.  At least initially, each page of a
transcript cost $4.00.  See Carol Christian, Yates Won’t Seek A New Trial, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 18, 2002,
at A25. For an intriguing historical account of the value of using transcripts in examining criminal
cases, see Caleb Crain, In Search of Lost Crime: Bloated Bodies, Bigamous Love, and Other Literary Pleas-
ures of the 19th Century Trial Transcript, LEGAL AFF., July/Aug. 2002, at 28-33.
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What is most striking about Dietz’s testimony is how his opinions about
Andrea’s mental state could carry so much authority with the jury. Criminal tri-
als commonly involve different sides presenting competing legal “stories” about
their version of the facts.33  The law’s role is to ensure that just verdicts result
from these conflicting representations. Courts must be perceived “as fair and
disinterested, capable of rising above the self-serving and adversarial narratives
by which cases are presented.”34 While the law provides evidentiary standards
and procedures to oversee what information is released in court and how,35 an
immense amount of discretion exists nonetheless in the ways stories can be told.
It remains unclear who is to police these narratives—beyond the structures al-
ready in place—or whether such oversight is even needed.
In the Yates case, the defense claimed that Andrea’s mental illness caused
her to believe that killing her children was the right course of action. Although
Andrea’s attorneys called a number of experts to prove their argument, each ex-
pert had a different twist on this central viewpoint.36 Therefore, the defense’s
story about Andrea, while emphasizing her insanity, was still somewhat mud-
dled. In contrast, the prosecution’s story about Andrea’s sanity was clearer and
also apparently consistent with the cultural norms of Harris County, Texas. The
prosecution argued that Andrea may have been gripped by her belief in some
demonic command, but she was still fully capable of knowing she was doing
something wrong.37  And Andrea seemed to concur, damningly perhaps.  Her
story was congruent with the prosecution’s. She had sinned and deserved pun-
ishment for acting out the devil’s dictates.38 In all likelihood, however, Andrea’s
own story was indicative of her mental illness,39 not evidence of the disposition
she felt she most deserved. Nonetheless, both her narrative and the prosecu-
tion’s were accentuated by courtroom storyteller, Park Dietz.
This Article analyzes the problematic aspects of Dietz’s testimony in an ef-
fort to contribute some balance to the Andrea Yates story. While Dietz’s com-
ments may have confirmed the Harris County jury’s preconceptions, they were
virtually unsubstantiated. Dietz also has no significant expertise in postpartum
33. See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 9, at 110 (explaining that “the law is awash in story-
telling”); see also LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 2 (Peter Brooks & Paul Ge-
wirtz eds., 1996) (examining law “not as rules and policies but as stories, explanations, perform-
ances, linguistic exchanges—as narratives and rhetoric”); JEROME BRUNER, MAKING STORIES: LAW,
LITERATURE, LIFE 3-62 (2002) (emphasizing the often unrecognized power of stories in legal pro-
ceedings).
34. BRUNER, supra note 33, at 37.
35. See generally PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (3d ed.
1999) (covering a wide span of different types of scientific evidence and the legal procedures used to
control their admissibility).
36. See App. 1 (Feb. 22-23, 2002; Feb. 26, 2002; Feb. 26-27, 2002) at 72-73; see also Brown, supra
note 21 (noting that “[d]efense witnesses included 11 psychiatrists, physicians and mental health ex-
perts”).
37. See infra notes 144, 175, 385-87 and accompanying text. But see infra notes 466-67 and accom-
panying text.
38. See supra notes 7, 12, 26 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 429-31 and accompanying
text.
39. See infra notes 245, 272-74 and accompanying text.
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depression or psychosis even though both sides agreed that Andrea severely
suffered from the disorders and that they significantly affected her conduct.
Of course, expert witnesses are routinely used in litigation.40  Dietz is sim-
ply one of the more prominent and prolific examples of what the criminal justice
system seeks.41  Despite the long history of expert witnesses in criminal trials, the
justice system should question the fairness and efficacy of such an unregulated
storytelling process. The potential for inequity is all the more pronounced in a
case where the prosecution’s story lacks factual justification, both sides agree the
defendant is mentally ill, and the death penalty is at stake.
Part I of this Article briefly discusses Andrea’s life up to her marriage to
Rusty as well as the outcome of her trial. Part II provides an overview of the in-
sanity defense and the strict Texas insanity standard. Part III examines Dietz’s
background, his reputation, and his psychiatric philosophy, in addition to his
proclivity to testify for the prosecution. Part IV describes Andrea’s history of
mental illness, especially her postpartum psychosis that started with the birth of
her first child and ended with a severe psychotic episode. Part V focuses on
Dietz’s testimony in the Yates trial, beginning with his pre-trial interview with
Andrea and ending with an analysis of his conclusions. The discussion empha-
sizes the speculative nature of many of Dietz’s statements and their lack of con-
nection to Andrea’s history of mental illness. Part VI presents the other perspec-
tives and experts in the Yates case, and considers how the case might have
reached a different result with a more consistent defense strategy or a less rigid
insanity standard.
The Andrea Yates case is a vast, book-length, narrative. This commentary
covers just a part of the trial. It is beyond this Article’s scope, for example, to
scrutinize the general role of psychiatric experts in the criminal justice system42
40. Renee L. Binder, Liability for the Psychiatrist Expert Witness, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1819, 1819-
20 (2002) (noting that “[a]n increasing number of general psychiatrists are acting as expert witnesses
in the legal system” and that “the use of experts in the legal system has proliferated in the past 30
years”); Steven Lubet, Expert Witnesses: Ethics and Professionalism, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 465, 465
(1999) (explaining that “[i]t is common in modern litigation to call individuals from a vast array of
professions to testify as experts,” including in criminal cases); L. Timothy Perrin, Expert Witness Tes-
timony: Back to the Future, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 1389, 1391 (1995) (stating that “expert testimony is used
more today than ever before. Lawyers seem incapable of trying a lawsuit without one or more ex-
perts.”).
41. See infra Part III.A.2. A Prosecutorial Bent; infra notes 146-49, 189, 216, 537 and accompany-
ing text. The pronounced role of physicians as experts in the criminal justice system has a long his-
tory. See JAMES C. MOHR, DOCTORS AND THE LAW: MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICA (1993) (discussing the evolution of the modern association between this country’s medical
profession and the legal system, including the evolving history of doctors testifying in court); Mark
Essig, Poison Murder and Expert Testimony: Doubting the Physician in Late Nineteenth-Century America,
14 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 177, 177 (2002) (noting that the “triumph of the expert” commenced around
1900, attaining by 1920 a level of “enthusiasm unmatched elsewhere” and explaining that
“[p]hysicians often occupy a starring role in this narrative of triumphant expertise” by developing
over the decades “a remarkably powerful and prestigious professional organization”).
42. For a thorough analysis of the subject see Christopher Slobogin, Psychiatric Evidence in
Criminal Trials: To Junk or Not to Junk?, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 2 (1998) (examining psychiatric and
psychological testimony in criminal trials and questioning “whether this type of opinion evidence is
worthy of consideration in courts of law”). See also J. Richard Ciccone, Expert Testimony, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 796, 796-99 (Warren Thomas Reich ed., 1995) (discussing the role of ex-
pert medical witnesses in the legal system, the advantages and disadvantages of the different models
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or to review the research on postpartum depression and postpartum psychosis,
which is available elsewhere.43 Nonetheless, examining one piece of the Yates
story can be enlightening. “Narrative, we are finally coming to realize, is indeed
serious business—whether in law, in literature, or in life.”44
I.  THE EARLY LIFE AND TRIAL OF ANDREA YATES
A. Meet the Yates Family
Andrea Yates was raised in the Houston area. Her family background ap-
peared to be middle-American and middle-class.45  Her father was a retired auto
shop teacher who died of Alzheimer’s disease shortly before the killings.46 Her
mother, Jutta Karin, was a homemaker.47 Andrea, the youngest of five, was ex-
pected to be a high achiever48 and, in high school, she succeeded: she was cap-
tain of the swim team, a National Honor Society member, and valedictorian49 of
her 1982 graduating class. Upon completing a two-year pre-nursing program at
the University of Houston, she went on to the University of Texas School of
Nursing in Houston, graduating in 1986.  From 1986 to 1994, she was employed
as a registered nurse at the University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center.50
for this role, as well as the ethics and admissibility of expert testimony) [hereinafter Ciccone, Expert
Testimony]; J. Richard Ciccone, Murder, Insanity, and Medical Expert Witnesses, 49 ARCH. NEUROL. 608,
608 (1992) (analyzing the history of the insanity defense and the modern role of medical expert wit-
nesses “in integrating clinical and laboratory findings”) [hereinafter Ciccone, Murder]; E.M. Coles &
H.O.F. Veiel, Expert Testimony and Pseudoscience: How Mental Health Professionals Are Taking Over the
Courtroom, 24 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 607, 607-08 (2001) (purporting to “draw attention to some at-
titudes and practices that corrupt science and pervert the original purpose of expert testimony”);
Arnold M. Ludwig, A Bad Case of Mixed Metaphors: Psychiatry, Law, Politics, Society, and Ezra Pound, 54
AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 116, 116 (2000) (contending that “psychiatry has become so impressed by its
seemingly scientific, diagnostic system and emerging technology that it no longer questions its fun-
damental conceptualizations”).
43. See, e.g., ANN L. DUNNEWOLD, EVALUATION AND TREATMENT OF POSTPARTUM EMOTIONAL
DISORDERS (1997); INFANTICIDE: PSYCHOSOCIAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON MOTHERS WHO KILL
(Margaret G. Spinelli ed., 2003); CHERYL L. MEYER & MICHELLE OBERMAN, MOTHERS WHO KILL THEIR
CHILDREN: UNDERSTANDING THE ACTS OF MOMS FROM SUSAN SMITH TO THE “PROM MOM” (2001);
LITA LINZER SCHWARTZ & NATALIE K. ISSER, ENDANGERED CHILDREN: NEONATICIDE, INFANTICIDE,
AND FILICIDE (2000); Deborah W. Denno, Gender, Crime, and the Criminal Law Defenses, 85 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 80, 138-42 (1994); Shaila Misri et al., Postpartum Blues and Depression, in UP TO DATE
(Burton D. Rose ed., 2003), available at http://www.uptodate.com [hereinafter Misri et al., Postpartum
Blues]; Shaila Misri et al., Postpartum Psychosis, in UP TO DATE (Burton D. Rose ed., 2003), available at
http://www.uptodate.com [hereinafter Misri et al., Postpartum Psychosis]. So far, this commentary is
limited, particularly in psychiatric journals, where it is most needed.
44. BRUNER, supra note 33, at 107.
45. See Roche, supra note 1, at 45.
46. See App. 1 (Mar. 12, 2001) at 67; Alan Bernstein & Miriam Garcia, A Life Unraveled: Mother
Depicted as Private, Caring and Burdened by Hidden Problems, HOUS. CHRON., June 24, 2001, at A1.
47. Bernstein & Garcia, supra note 46.
48. See Roche, supra note 1, at 45.
49. See Paula Zahn & Ed Lavandera, Do New 911 Tapes Help Andrea Yates Defense?, MORNINGS
WITH PAULA ZAHN (CNN television broadcast, Dec. 12, 2001) available at http://www.cnn.com/
transcripts/0112/12/ltm.11. html.
50. See Roche, supra note 1, at 45.
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Andrea’s nursing career ceased entirely, however, soon after her marriage to
Rusty.51 
Andrea and Rusty first met in 1989 at the Houston apartment complex
where they both resided.  Both were twenty-five at the time.52  Rusty, “a popular
jock” in high school and a summa cum laude graduate of Auburn University,
was designing computer systems for NASA.53 Andrea approached him first in
conversation—an uncharacteristically bold move for her, Rusty would later re-
veal.54 Only after Andrea’s arrest would Rusty learn that she had never dated
until she had turned twenty-three, that she was recuperating from a romantic
break-up at the time they met, and that her directness in initiating contact with
him was prompted by intense loneliness and, perhaps, depression.55 Andrea and
Rusty spent the next few years becoming acquainted, “living together, reading
the Bible, and praying.”56
Their April 17, 1993 wedding ceremony was small and simple. Surpris-
ingly, it was also nondenominational,57 perhaps because of the influence of
Rusty’s spiritual mentor, Michael Woroniecki, from whom “[h]e had learned the
faults of organized religion.”58 The couple confidently announced to wedding
guests that they would not use birth control—they wanted as many children as
nature would provide.59 Their desire for children was immediately fulfilled.
Within three months, Andrea was pregnant60 with the first of five children. Eight
years later she would kill them all.61
B. The Yates Trial
On July 30, 2001, Andrea was indicted on two counts of capital murder for
the deaths of Noah (seven), John (five), and Mary (six months),62 but not for the
deaths of her other two children, Luke (three) and Paul (two).63 All of the in-
dictments were for capital murder because they involved more than one person
and victims less than six years old.64 On the same day, Andrea’s attorneys,
George Parnham and Wendell Odom, filed a “notice of intent to offer evidence
of the insanity defense,” based upon the testimony of two psychiatrists claiming
51. See id.
52. See id.; SPENCER, supra note 1, at 129.
53. See SPENCER, supra note 1, at 128; Roche, supra note 1, at 45.
54. See SPENCER, supra note 1, at 129; Roche, supra note 1, at 45.
55. See SPENCER, supra note 1, at 80 (citing evidence that Andrea had been treated for depression
when she was working as a nurse).
56. See Roche, supra note 1, at 45.
57. See App. 1 (Apr. 17, 1993) at 61.
58. Roche, supra note 1, at 48; see also Keith Morrison, A Preacher Speaks Out: Spiritual Advisor to
Andrea and Rusty Yates Talks about the Tragedy, Dateline NBC (NBC television broadcast, Mar. 20, 2002)
available at http:// www.msnbc.com/news/726946.asp?0dm=-24GV&cp1=1 (noting Woroniecki’s
view that priests and churches are not necessary components of religious worship).
59. See App. 1 (Apr. 17, 1993) at 61.
60. See id. (June 1993) at 61.
61. See id. (June 20, 2001) at 70.
62. See id. (July 30, 2001) at 71.
63. See id.
64. See id.
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that Andrea was, at the time of the killings, “mentally insane” as defined by the
Texas Penal Code.65
The insanity defense for Andrea would ultimately dissolve.66 Within eight
months following her indictment, one jury decided that Andrea was sufficiently
competent to stand trial for killing her children67 and another refused her insan-
ity plea.68 Although this second jury declined to impose the death penalty,69 An-
drea received a mandatory life sentence for the killings.70 Under the Texas capi-
tal felony statute, an inmate must serve forty years in prison before becoming
eligible for parole.71 The case is currently on appeal.72
Many theories could explain Andrea’s conviction. Of course, the primary
theory would speculate that the jury was so horrified by Andrea’s acts that any
psychiatric evidence offered on her behalf paled in comparison. Yet, the con-
tinuing controversy and debate over Andrea’s conviction73 suggest that there
may be other, more complex, explanations.
Additional rationales primarily point to the retributive aspects of Texas law
and culture. As one Harris County resident explained, “There’s the rule of law,
and there’s the rule of law in Texas . . . . The rule of law in Texas is kind of cow-
boy law.”74  For example, Texas consistently executes more individuals than any
other state;75 annually it accounts for one-third of all executions in the country,76
a pattern that conflicts with both national and international abolitionist trends.
Harris County in particular is responsible for over one-third of the state’s death
row inmates, making it the harshest death penalty jurisdiction in the country77
65. See id.
66. See id. (Mar. 12, 2002) at 74. Because the trial transcript is not yet fully available, the exact
details of the Yates case are not known apart from what has been published in the media. See supra
note 30 and accompanying text.
67. See App. 1 (Sept. 22, 2001) at 72.
68. See id. (Mar. 12, 2002) at 74.
69. See id. (Mar. 16, 2002) at 74-75.
70. See id. (Mar. 18, 2002) at 75.
71. See id. (Mar. 18, 2002 n.209) at 84.
72. See id. (Apr. 3, 2002) at 75.
73. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text and infra note 145 and accompanying text.
74. Kate Zernike, A Wife Betrayed Finds Sympathy at Murder Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2003, at
A18 (quoting a resident in neurosurgery).
75. Deborah W. Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death: The Troubling Paradox Behind State Uses
of Electrocution and Lethal Injection and What It Says About Us, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 63, 116-17 (2002); Wil-
liam S. Lofquist, Putting Them There, Keeping Them There, and Killing Them: An Analysis of State-Level
Variations in Death Penalty Intensity, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1505, 1546-47 (2002); Amnesty International,
United States of America: Texas—In a World of its Own as 300th Execution Looms, Jan. 23, 2003, available
at http://www.web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR510102003?open&of=ENG-USA.
76. Amnesty International, supra note 75 (stating that “[w]hile the State of Texas accounts for
less than 10 per cent of the USA’s population, it has been responsible for more than a third of the na-
tional judicial death toll since 1976”).
77. Id.; see also SPENCER, supra note 1, at 148 (asserting that “Harris County proudly called itself
the death capital of the United States”); Cheryl L. Meyer & Margaret G. Spinelli, Medical and Legal
Dilemmas of Postpartum Psychiatric Disorders, in Spinelli, supra note 43, at 167, 174 (noting that “Harris
county prosecutors have sent more people to death row than any other county in Texas, a state that
has led the nation in executions”); A Deadly Distinction, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 5, 2001, at A1 (empha-
sizing that, with respect to the rates of execution attributed to Harris County, “one of the cruellest
anomalies of the modern system of capital punishment” is that “geography means everything”);
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and one of the most punitive in the Western world.78 If Harris County were con-
sidered a state, it would follow only two other states (Texas and Virginia) in its
number of executions since 1977.79
Because the Yates prosecution sought the death penalty, Andrea’s jury was
“death qualified.” In other words, the prosecution could exclude potential jurors
for cause if their negative views toward the death penalty were so strong they
“would ‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of [their] duties as [ju-
rors]’”80 and therefore render them “unable to faithfully and impartially apply
the law.”81 Research shows that death qualified juries are more anti-civil liber-
tarian in attitude, particularly with respect to such principles as presumption of
innocence and burden of proof, and they are significantly more likely to convict
than juries that are not death qualified.82 Presumably, then, Andrea’s jury was
far less able to “comprehend the inconceivable”83 in evaluating an insanity de-
fense relative to a jury that had not been death qualified.
The Texas insanity standard is a comparably strict rule of law; in the eyes of
one legal commentator, it is “one of the most stringent” in the United States.84
Andrew Gumbel, In God’s Name, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Mar. 14, 2002, at 1 (“Yates had the
misfortune to fall under the jurisdiction of Harris County . . . which has a reputation as the most
gung-ho prosecutorial machine in the United States. It has sent more defendants to Death Row than
any other county, a fact that its prosecutors tend to wear as a badge of pride.”).
78. Amnesty International, supra note 75. See generally ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A
WORLDWIDE PERSPECTIVE (3d ed. 2002) (documenting the increase in abolitionist countries over the
decades).
79. Amnesty International, supra note 75. The death penalty statistics on Harris County are
daunting. According to the Amnesty International report:
If Texas is the death penalty capital of the USA, Harris County, home to about 15 per cent
of the state’s population, is its main supplier of condemned inmates. Thirty-five per cent of
the 450 men and women on death row in Texas were sent there by Harris County juries.
Only seven of the thirty-eight death penalty states in the USA—Alabama, California, Flor-
ida, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and the rest of Texas—currently have more peo-
ple on death row than Harris County. Nearly a quarter of the 291 prisoners executed in
Texas between December 1982 and December 2002 were sentenced to death in this county.
Id.
80. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985).
81. Id. at 426.
82. Brooke M. Butler & Gary Moran, The Role of Death Qualification in Venirepersons’ Evaluations
of Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances in Capital Trials, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 175, 176-77
(2002); see also State v. Yates, Motion to Prevent the State from Excluding Qualified Jurors (Dist. Ct.
Harris County, Tex.) (Oct. 30, 2001) (contending that “the state is acting in bad faith in seeking the
death penalty based on the unique facts in this case and as such depriving the defendant of jurors
she is constitutionally entitled to have sit in judgment over her”).
83. George J. Parnham, Insanity: Helping the Jury Comprehend the Inconceivable 2 (n.d.)  (on file
with author) (noting that “there is a surprising percentage of the general population that simply re-
fuses to accept the reality of a mental disease” and that “[m]any of the potential jurors, if they are
honest, will acknowledge their belief that the defense of insanity is simply an excuse and/or trick
used by defense attorneys to get a, yet, otherwise responsible individual ‘off the hook’”).
84. Elaine Cassel, The Andrea Yates Verdict and Sentence: Did the Jury Do the Right Thing?,
FINDLAW’S WRIT, Mar. 18, 2002, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20020318_cassel.
html; see also TOM WHATLEY, RESHAPING THE INSANITY DEFENSE, House Study Group: Special Legis-
lature Rep. 5 (Tex. House of Representatives 1984) (comparing the Texas death penalty standard to
other state standards); Pam Easton, Parnham: Insanity Statute Needs to Change,
HOUSTONCHRONICLE.COM, Mar. 28, 2002, at http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/story.hts/special/
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The Yates jury judged psychiatric testimony not only by Texas culture but also
by that culture’s narrow legal view of what constitutes insanity.
II.  THE INSANITY DEFENSE
A. A Brief Overview of the Insanity Defense
Part II explores only the very basics of the insanity defense and how it is
applied in the state of Texas.85  The insanity defense is considered one of the
most controversial criminal law doctrines, not only because of intense debate
over how “insanity” should be defined, but also because of increasing conflict
over whether the defense should exist in any form.86  Statistics show that insan-
ity pleas are seldom raised or successful in states throughout the country,87 in-
cluding Texas.88 Nonetheless, the defense rankles social and community tensions
over two conflicting goals: the desire to punish the horrendous, highly publi-
cized crimes that the public typically hears about versus the need to understand
that some mentally ill people should not be held responsible for what they do.89
1. The Major Legal Standards for Insanity
The legal standard for insanity varies across the fifty states.90 The first and
strictest insanity test of modern usage was introduced in 1843 by the English
House of Lords in the M’Naghten case.91 Under M’Naghten, a person is insane if,
because of a “disease of the mind” at the time she committed the act, she (1) did
drownings/1321217 (discussing a panel at Texas Southern University Law School concerning efforts
to change the state’s insanity statute as a result of the conviction of Andrea Yates).
85. See generally GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A
HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 186-248 (2d ed. 1997) (discussing the
basic procedural aspects of the insanity defense); MICHAEL L. PERLIN, 4 MENTAL DISABILITY LAW:
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL (2d ed. 2001); RALPH REISNER ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM:
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS (3d ed. 1999).
86. See Michael L. Perlin, Excuse: Insanity, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & JUSTICE 650-57 (Joshua
Dressler et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002); Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity: Recasting the Role of Mental
Disability in Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REV. 1199, 1199-200 (2000).
87. See generally MELTON ET AL., supra note 85, at 187-88 (providing state-wide comparisons
demonstrating how infrequently the insanity plea is made and the low rate in which it is successful);
PERLIN, supra note 85, at § 9C-3.1, 331-32 (noting the tendency of the public and the legal profession
to “‘grossly’ overestimate” the number of insanity verdicts).  For example, nationally, insanity ac-
quittals probably constitute no more than 0.2 percent of terminated felony prosecutions.  NAT’L
MENTAL HEALTH ASS’N, MYTHS & REALITIES: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE
INSANITY DEFENSE 15 (1983).  Data from New York specifically demonstrate a similar pattern. Defen-
dants raise the insanity defense about once in every 600 to 700 cases and the defense is successful in
about twenty-five percent of the cases in which it is invoked.  Id.
88. WHATLEY, supra note 84, at 10-11.
89. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 335 (3d ed. 2001).
90. MELTON ET AL., supra note 85, at 192-93. During the course of this country’s history, five in-
sanity standards have been used at some point: the M’Naghten rule; the “irresistible impulse” or
“control” test; the Durham or “product” test; the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code stan-
dard in § 4.01; and the federal statutory standard for insanity. See id. at 190-93.
91. 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). For a superb discussion of the history of  the M’Naghten Case, see
RICHARD MORAN, KNOWING RIGHT FROM WRONG: THE INSANITY DEFENSE OF DANIEL MCNAUGHTAN
(1981).
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not know the “nature and quality of the act” that she was performing; or (2) if
she was aware of the act, she did not know that what she “was doing was
wrong,” that is, she did not know the difference between right and wrong.92  The
M’Naghten rule, which soon became the most widely accepted insanity test in
the United States,93 considers only cognitive ability and not volitional conduct.94
Concern over the narrowness of the M’Naghten test prompted attempts
over the years to replace it.95 The most successful attempt was the American Law
Institute (ALI)’s 1962 insanity test which rapidly gained support from legisla-
tures and courts; by the 1980s, the ALI standard was adopted nearly unani-
mously by the federal circuit courts and over one-half of the states.96 Under the
ALI test, an individual is not responsible for her criminal conduct if, because of
mental disease or defect, she either lacked “substantial capacity” to appreciate
the “criminality” (or, at the opting of the state legislature, the “wrongfulness”)
of her conduct, or she failed to “conform” her conduct “to the requirements of
law.”97
The differences between the ALI and M’Naghten tests are striking. For ex-
ample, the ALI test accepts both cognitive and volitional impairment as an excuse.
In other words, the test considers a defendant’s cognitive ability to “appreciate”
the criminality or wrongfulness of her conduct as well as her ability to “con-
form” her conduct to the law.98 This added “conform” requirement is often char-
acterized as a “lack-of-control defense,” pertaining to those individuals whose
mental disease or defect leads them to lose control over their actions at the time
they commit an offense.99
The ALI and M’Naghten standards vary in other important ways. The ALI
test requires only that defendants “lack substantial capacity,” not total capac-
92. M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. at 722. The exact standard is as follows:
[T]o establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the
time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of
reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was
doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong. The
mode of putting the latter part of the question to the jury on these occasions has generally
been, whether the accused at the time of doing the act knew the difference between right
and wrong.
Id. Compare infra note 132.
93. MELTON ET AL., supra note 85, at 191.
94. Slobogin, supra note 86, at 1210-11 (reviewing the literature criticizing this narrow scope).
95. See Grant H. Morris & Ansar Haroun, “God Told Me to Kill”: Religion or Delusion?, 38 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 973 (2001).
96. PERLIN, supra note 85, at 162.
97. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1)  at 163 (Official Draft and Revised Comments, 1985)  [herein-
after MODEL PENAL CODE 1985]. The exact standard is as follows:
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result
of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality
[wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.
Id.
98. See supra notes 92, 94, 97.
99. MELTON ET AL., supra note 85, at 198-201.
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ity.100 In turn, the ALI applies the broader term “appreciate” rather than “know”
when specifying the type of cognitive impairment that leads to insanity; hence,
the defendant’s lack of emotional understanding can be incorporated into the
defense.101 The ALI test also allows the state legislature to consider “wrongful-
ness” rather than “criminality.” This choice enables a finding of insanity if the
accused does not know the act was illegal and also if she believes the act was
“morally justified” according to community standards.102 At the same time, both
the ALI and M’Naghten tests skirt any set definition of the term “mental disease
or defect.”103 According to the ALI, such an open-ended approach allows the
term “to accommodate developing medical understanding”104 and therefore
avoid the constraints of old science.
The popularity of the ALI test dwindled in 1981 when a jury found John
Hinckley not guilty by reason of insanity, based on an ALI standard, for his at-
tempted assassination of Ronald Reagan.105 The effects of the public furor over
Hinckley’s acquittal were immediate:106 the federal government and several of
the ALI test states abolished the volitional component of the test entirely and
imposed other limits, in some cases reverting back to a M’Naghten-type stan-
dard.107  According to a 1995 survey of insanity laws, about twenty states still use
the ALI test while nearly half of the states apply “[s]ome variation of the
M’Naghten/cognitive impairment-only test.”108 A handful of states have abol-
ished the insanity defense entirely.109
2. Modern Problems with the M’Naghten Insanity Standard
The return to a M’Naghten-type standard spotlights the problems that the
test has always had and why there have been continuing efforts to change it. For
100. According to the ALI drafters, “[t]he adoption of the standard of substantial capacity may
well be the Code’s most significant alteration of the prevailing tests.” MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, su-
pra note 97, § 4.01 cmt. 3, at 172.
101. Id. at 169 (“The use of [the term] ‘appreciate’ rather than ‘know’ conveys a broader sense of
understanding than simple cognition.”).
102. Id. at 169-70.
103. MELTON ET AL., supra note 85, at 196 (explaining that “legal definitions of the mental disease
or defect threshold, if they exist at all, are extremely vague and will vary from jurisdiction to juris-
diction. Thus, it would be unwise to assume that a particular diagnosis can be equated with insanity
or its threshold.”).
104. MODEL PENAL CODE 1985, supra note 97, § 4.01 cmt. 3, at 169.
105. PERLIN, supra note 85, at 325-28; REISNER ET AL., supra note 85, at 538-39. For a thorough ac-
count of the Hinckley case, see RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., THE TRIAL OF JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR.: A
CASE STUDY IN THE INSANITY DEFENSE (2d ed. 2000); LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE AND
THE TRIAL OF JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR. (1984).
106. The swift reforms in the insanity defense following the Hinckley verdict demonstrate the
strength of public opinion. Polls conducted the day after the verdict was announced showed so
much public indignation that legislative and presidential reaction and change were immediate. See
Valerie P. Hans & Dan Slater, John Hinckley, Jr. and the Insanity Defense: The Public’s Verdict, 47 PUB.
OPINION Q. 202, 202-03 (1983) (for example, Delaware passed new legislation the day after the ver-
dict was announced).
107. REISNER ET AL., supra note 85, at 526-27.
108. MELTON ET AL., supra note 85, at 193.
109. Slobogin, supra note 86, at 1200 n.2, 1214 (the five states are Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Ne-
vada, and Utah).
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example, the word “know” and the phrase “nature and quality of the act” can be
defined either very broadly or narrowly.110 Such vagueness gives legal actors lit-
tle guidance for interpreting the test and heightens the chance that they will ap-
ply it inconsistently across different cases. Likewise, it is not clear whether the
“wrong” in the right-and-wrong prong pertains to legal or moral wrongdoing
because the language in M’Naghten itself could bolster either approach.111  Eng-
land has since established that the right-and-wrong element represents the de-
fendant’s recognition that an act is legally wrong.112 Yet, American law sides in
the opposite direction.113 Most American courts have interpreted the word
“wrong” to mean “moral wrong,” not “legal wrong.”114  This issue was impor-
tant in the Yates case because Texas law does not specify a particular approach115
and a moral wrong approach would have benefited Andrea. According to some
defense experts, Andrea knew that her acts were illegal but she believed they
were morally right, given the context of her delusional circumstances.116
In American states that apply the moral right-and-wrong test, questions
typically concern whether the defendant knowingly transgressed society’s stan-
dards of morality, not whether the defendant personally perceived her acts to be
morally acceptable. In other words, even if a defendant is mentally ill and, as a
result, commits an offense that she believes is morally correct, she is considered
sane if she is aware that her conduct is condemned by society.117  As one com-
mentator notes, however, this difference can “be blurred to near extinction” de-
pending on how the particular circumstances in a case are pitched.118 For exam-
ple, a mentally ill individual “is apt to know that society considers it morally
wrong to kill, but if she is acting pursuant to a delusionary belief that God wants
her to kill, she might now believe that society would agree with her God-
endorsed actions.”119
Interpretation of the moral-right-and-wrong standard can vary somewhat
in the few M’Naghten jurisdictions that have a “deific decree doctrine,” in other
words, a rule that allows a mentally disordered defendant to be judged legally
insane if she believes that she is acting under the direct command of God (for
110. DRESSLER, supra note 89, at 346-47 (2001).
111. Id. at 347; see also Morris & Haroun, supra note 95, at 1008 (explaining that the M’Naghten
judges did not specify “whether a defendant is insane if he or she knows the act is illegal, but who,
through mental disorder, believes the act to be moral”).
112. Regina v. Windle, 2 All E.R. 1, 2 (1952).
113. Morris & Haroun, supra note 95, at 1013.
114. Id. at 1013 n.247 (“Although a few courts have construed the word ‘wrong’ to mean ‘legal
wrong,’ most have adopted the ‘moral wrong’ interpretation.”) (citations omitted).
115. See infra notes 130-37, 144-45 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 463-65 and accompanying text.
117. DRESSLER, supra note 89, at 347. The California Supreme Court has clarified the distinction:
[M]orality . . . is . . . not simply the individual’s belief in what conduct is or is not good.
While it need not reflect the principles of a recognized religion and does not demand belief
in a God or other supreme being, it does require a sincerely held belief grounded in gener-
ally accepted ethical or moral principles derived from an external source.
People v. Coddington, 2 P.3d 1081, 1144 (Cal. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Price v. Superior
Court, 25 P.3d 618 (Cal. 2001).
118. DRESSLER, supra note 89, at 347 n.73.
119. Id.
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example, a belief that God commanded the defendant to kill someone).120 Two
primary rationales explain the origins of the deific decree doctrine. First, the
doctrine “was merely a logical extension of the Judeo-Christian belief that God
would not order a person to kill another” because the Sixth Commandment
prohibits murder.121 Therefore, a person thinking that God is commanding her to
kill is entertaining a false belief and thus should not be held accountable. Like-
wise, nineteenth-century courts and juries would not grant the insanity defense
to individuals contending that they acted under the command of the Devil or
some other religiously corrupt figure because people accepted only “the One
True God.”122 Second, the doctrine may have been a vehicle for inserting a voli-
tional component exception to the cognitive-only limitations of the M’Naghten
rule so that M’Naghten could incorporate at least a narrow category of uncon-
trolled individuals.123
The exceptions and qualifications for the deific decree doctrine apparently
still apply today for defendants experiencing such “command hallucinations.”124
The doctrine presumes that the defendant’s behavior results from a delusion (a
“false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality”),125 and not from
a religious conviction,126 although determining the difference between the two
can be very difficult.127 While some jurisdictions treat the deific decree rule as an
exception to the general insanity standard, other jurisdictions view it as a major
factor in assessing an individual’s capability to tell right from wrong.128 Irrespec-
tive of a jurisdiction’s particular approach, these right-wrong issues were key in
the Andrea Yates case.  Andrea’s command hallucinations were a focus of the
120. Morris & Haroun, supra note 95, at 1003.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1004.
123. Id.
124. A hallucination is “[a] sensory perception that has the compelling sense of reality of a true
perception but that occurs without external stimulation of the relevant sensory organ . . . . The per-
son may or may not have insight into the fact that he or she is having a hallucination.” AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, TEXT
REVISION (DSM-IV-TR) 823 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR].
125. Id. at 821. A more complete definition of “delusion” is as follows:
A false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality that is firmly sustained
despite what almost everyone else believes and despite what constitutes incontrovertible
and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary. The belief is not one ordinarily accepted by
other members of the person’s culture or subculture (e.g., it is not an article of religious
faith). When a false belief involves a value judgment, it is regarded as a delusion only
when the judgment is so extreme as to defy credibility. Delusional conviction occurs on a
continuum and can sometimes be inferred from an individual’s behavior. It is often diffi-
cult to distinguish between a delusion and an overvalued idea (in which case the individ-
ual has an unreasonable belief or idea but does not hold it as firmly as is the case with a
delusion).
Id.
126. Morris & Haroun, supra note 95, at 1003.
127. See id. at 1014.
128. DRESSLER, supra note 89, at 348.
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expert testimony and what was supposed to be considered “wrong” was neither
specified, nor constrained, in the jury charge.129
B. The Texas Insanity Standard
In 1973, Texas joined the ranks of other states and adopted the more lenient
ALI definition of insanity.130 A decade later, however, the state returned to a
M’Naghten type standard, partly in response to developments surrounding the
Hinckley verdict.131 Yet, a critical feature of the Texas test132 is that it is even nar-
rower than M’Naghten, although comparably confusing.  The typical M’Naghten
standard refers to two parts: the defendant’s ability to know (1) the “nature and
quality of the act committed” or (2) whether the act was “right or wrong.”133 The
Texas standard, however, eliminates the first part and refers only to the second,
that is, whether the defendant knew the act was right or wrong.134 Texas also
limits the defense to cases of severe mental illness and puts the burden of proving
insanity on defendants.135 As legal commentators rightly contend, the Texas
standard “could hardly be narrower”136 or more “impossible to meet.”137
Similar to the M’Naghten standard, defining the terms “right” and “wrong”
is a problem.138 For example, the Texas insanity statute does not clarify whether
“wrong” should be considered from a legal or a moral standpoint.139 This ambi-
guity was a key issue in the Yates case, both for the law and the psychiatric pro-
129. Mary Connell, Expert Opinion, AM. PSYCHOL. L. SOC’Y NEWS, Spring/Summer 2002, at 18, 19
(quoting Mary Alice Conroy, the Director of Practicum Training for the Forensic Clinical Psychology
Program at Sam Houston State University).
130. Ray Farabee & James L. Spearly, The New Insanity Law in Texas: Reliable Testimony and Judicial
Review of Release, 24 S. TEX. L. J. 671, 673 (1983).
131. WHATLEY, supra note 84, at 5.
132. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01 (Vernon 2002).  The Texas test defines insanity in the fol-
lowing terms:
(a) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution that, at the time of the conduct charged, the
actor, as a result of severe mental disease or defect, did not know that his conduct was
wrong.  (b) The term ‘mental disease or defect’ does not include an abnormality mani-
fested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.
Id.
133. See supra notes 91-94, 110-14 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 132; see also infra notes 141-43 and accompanying text (describing the confu-
sion concerning jurors’ interpretations of “wrong”).
135. WHATLEY, supra note 84, at 12; see also Farabee & Spearly, supra note 130, at 681-84.
136. Cassel, supra note 84; see also Jennifer Bard, Unjust Rules for Insanity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13,
2002, at A25; Katherine Seligman, Legal Affairs, S. F. CHRON., Mar. 17, 2002, at A6.
137. Bard, supra note 136; Seligman, supra note 136.
138. See supra notes 110-13.
139. Connell, supra note 129, at 18-19. According to Mary Alice Conroy, the Director of Practicum
Training for the Forensic Clinical Psychology Program at Sam Houston State University, id. at 18,
Bigby v. State, 892 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. Crim. Ct. App. 1994), is often cited as bolstering a very limited,
totally legal, definition of “wrong.” Connell, supra note 129, at 18. However, Conroy notes that Bigby
did not directly address the conflict between moral and legal wrongfulness because the defendant,
who was denied the insanity defense, stated that his actions were illegal. While the Bigby court en-
abled the state to contend that “wrong” should mean legally wrong, the court’s effort was to uphold
the jury’s use of reasonable discretion in how it would view the word “wrong” rather than binding
future courts with a definition of “legal wrong.” Id.
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fession. As one psychiatric expert commenting on the case said, there is still no
“test” available to determine who is genuinely controlled by command halluci-
nations; rather, psychiatrists must rely on “a certain degree of approximation[]”
in their assessments.140 Likewise, the Yates jury charge did not specify what
“wrong” should mean and expert testimony did not seem to restrict the defini-
tion of “wrongfulness.”141 The Yates jury was free to use the term’s “common
and ordinary meaning”142 and apply “the statutory language to the facts as it
saw fit.”143
Such a legally muddled circumstance prompted conflicting approaches to
interpreting the Texas insanity standard. As the Yates case evolved, for example,
it became clear that both the prosecution and the defense would define the legal-
or-moral wrong issue because of the statute’s silence. Both sides agreed that
Andrea was mentally ill and, in general, that she knew her actions were legally
wrong.144  The issue of whether Andrea’s mental illness rendered her unable to
control her actions, although hotly debated, was moot under the narrow con-
fines of the Texas insanity statute.145  Thus, only one significant question was left
for the jury to resolve: Did Andrea know that her actions were morally wrong?
III.  PARK DIETZ’S EXPERTISE AND PSYCHIATRIC PHILOSOPHY
There was little legal or psychiatric clarity guiding the determinations to be
made in the Yates case. For this reason, the opinions of expert witnesses were
especially important. According to a synopsis of the ethical guidelines estab-
lished by the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, “the medical ex-
pert is expected to provide a clinical evaluation and a review of the applicable
data in light of the legal question posed and in the spirit of honesty and striving
for objectivity—the expert’s ethical and professional obligation.”146 The Academy
specifies that such an obligation “includes a thorough, fair, and impartial review
and should not exclude any relevant information in order to create a view fa-
voring either the plaintiff or the defendant.”147
According to some legal commentators, Park Dietz’s expert testimony was
considered “crucial”148 for the conviction of Andrea Yates—the “defining mo-
ment” of the trial.149 Part III examines Dietz’s background, experience, and psy-
140. Michael Jonathan Grinfeld, Mother’s Murder Conviction Turns Insanity Defense Suspect, 19
PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, June 2002, available at  http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/p020601.html.
141. Connell, supra note 129, at 18-19.
142. Id. at 19.
143. Cassel, supra note 84.
144. See generally infra Part VI (discussing experts’ views of Andrea’s knowledge of the legality of
her actions).
145. Brown, supra note 21.
146. Ciccone, Expert Testimony, supra note 42, at 797 (citing the American Academy of Psychiatry
and the Law, Ethical Guidelines for the Practice of Forensic Psychiatry, 12 NEWSLETTER 16, 17 (1987)).
147. Id.
148. Interview: Dr. Park Dietz, TIME.COM, Mar. 19, 2002, available at http://www.time.com/time/
nation/printout/0,8816,218743,00.html.
149. The Yates Case: Criminal Defense Attorney Brian Wice Comments on the Trial of the Houston
Mother Who Drowned Her Five Children, COURTTV.COM, Mar. 7, 2002, available at http://www.courttv.
com/talk/chat_transcripts/2002/0307yates-wice.html (quoting criminal defense attorney Brian
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chiatric philosophy in an effort to explain why Dietz’s story about Andrea
seemed so much more compelling than the other stories experts had to offer.
Notably, much of the information about Dietz derives from interviews with
Dietz himself, or from his supporters, in magazines and newspapers. Dietz is
commendably forthright about his views in general and was immediately open
to commenting on the Yates case as soon as Andrea was sentenced.150 What be-
comes apparent is how his own self-described, pro-prosecution leanings could
mesh so well with a death qualified, Harris County jury.
A. Dietz’s Background and Reputation
Park Dietz is considered one of the most “prominent and provocative” psy-
chiatric expert witnesses in the country.151 In one professional capacity or an-
other, he has been involved with a long list of famous homicide defendants:
John Hinckley, Jr., Jeffrey Dahmer, Susan Smith, Melissa Drexler, the Menendez
brothers, O.J. Simpson (in the civil case), and Ted Kaczynski, to name a few.152
He can now add Andrea Yates to that list. As the prosecution’s star witness in
the Yates case,153 he both interviewed and videotaped Andrea,154 and he subse-
quently testified in court about his evaluation.155
Dietz also has extensive professional credentials. He acquired a B.A. from
Cornell in biology and psychology, an M.D. from Johns Hopkins School of
Medicine, and a Masters in Public Health and Ph.D. in sociology, both from
Johns Hopkins. He has held academic posts at Johns Hopkins, the University of
Pennsylvania, Harvard, and the University of Virginia.156  His professional expe-
rience is substantial, including consulting positions with the Department of Jus-
tice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.157 In addition, Dietz has over one
hundred publications, “nearly all” of which concern violent or injurious behav-
ior,158 and he has examined “thousands” of criminal defendants for forensic psy-
chiatric purposes, including sanity determinations.159
Currently (and at the time he testified in the Yates trial), Dietz runs two
businesses in Newport Beach, California. He is the president and founder of
Park Dietz & Associates, Inc., forensic consultants in medicine and the behav-
Wice as stating that Andrea’s fate “will likely turn” on the cross-examination of Dietz, which “will
for better or worse be the defining moment of this trial”).
150. Dietz’s interview in the New York Times a month after Andrea’s sentencing was particularly
noteworthy. See Anastasia Toufexis, A Conversation with Park Dietz: A Psychiatrist’s-Eye View of Mur-
der and Insanity, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2002, at F5.
151. Id.; see also Joyce Johnson, Witness for the Prosecution, NEW YORKER, May 16, 1994, at 42 (char-
acterizing Dietz as “the virtuoso expert witness who keeps showing up on Court TV”).
152. See App. 4 at 99, tr. at 11; see also Toufexis, supra note 150.
153. Carol Christian, Prosecution Witness in Yates Trial Assailed, HOUS. CHRON., Apr. 30, 2002, at
A17 (referring to Dietz as the “prosecution’s star witness” in the Yates case).
154. See App. 4 at 99, tr. at 15; Transcript of Park Dietz’s interview with Andrea Yates (Nov. 7,
2001) [hereinafter Dietz-Yates interview] (full transcript on file with  author).
155. See generally App. 4.
156. See id. at 97-98, tr. at 1-7.
157. See id. at 98, tr. at 6-7.
158. See id. at 98-99, tr. at 7-8.
159. See id. at 99, tr. at 8.
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ioral sciences, as well as president and founder of Threat Assessment Group,
Inc. (TAG), which specializes in the prevention of workplace violence.160 Before
arriving in Houston to testify in the Yates case, Dietz mailed his business bro-
chure (describing his companies and the types of cases on which they work) to a
wide range of members of Houston’s legal community—prosecutors, defense
attorneys, attorneys specializing in premises liability for violent crime, and law-
yers representing elder abuse victims.161 Although the Yates defense brought
forth evidence of Dietz’s brochure distribution during cross-examination in an
effort to portray Dietz as a “professional testifier,”162 Dietz did not seem apolo-
getic.163 Nor did such a revelation appear to dent the perceived validity of his
testimony.
1. A Desire to Emphasize “Facts”
Media articles about Dietz claim he is known for emphasizing “facts”
rather than “theoretical conjecture” when evaluating a case.164 Indeed, both Dr.
Jonas Rappeport, a renowned professor of Dietz’s at Johns Hopkins Medical
School,165 as well as Roger Adelman, one of the prosecutors in the Hinckley
case,166 credit Dietz’s precision and “focus on the facts” as major contributions
Dietz has brought to modernizing the field of forensic psychiatry.
In line with this facts-driven orientation, Dietz seems to be more concerned
with the physical evidence linked to a crime than with the defendant’s history
that can be acquired in an interview.167 According to Dietz, for example, inter-
views with defendants have typically “been the linchpin of forensic assess-
ments”; yet, there are “serious risks” associated with them because the
“[n]atural human techniques for gaining information from an interview un-
thinkingly cut corners by suggesting answers or guessing at the answer or of-
fering multiple choices.”168  Such leading or suggestive procedures are compara-
ble to crime scene evidence that has been contaminated or corrupted.169 Dietz
favors instead the second source of mental evidence, which includes examining
the crime scene, analyzing autopsies and weapons, and interviewing witnesses
to the crime.170 Although “the ideal” would be to have both types of evidence
when making an evaluation, Dietz has stated that, “[i]f I had to choose between
160. See id. at 124-25, tr. at 147-50; see also Park Dietz & Associates, Inc., website at http://www.
parkdietzassociates.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2003) (providing a complete description of Dietz’s busi-
nesses).
161. See App. 4 at 124-25, tr. at 150-53.
162. See id. at 125, tr. at 151-52.
163. See generally App. 4.
164. Johnson, supra note 151, at 43; see also Dale Keiger, The Dark World of Park Dietz, JOHNS
HOPKINS MAG., Nov. 1994, available at http://www.jhu.edu/~jhumag/1194web/dietz.html (stating
that “Dietz is known for stringent analysis of the facts of a case and an avoidance of opinion when
on the witness stand”).
165. Johnson, supra note 151, at 43.
166. Keiger, supra note 164 (citing Roger M. Adelman, a prosecutor on the Hinckley case and
now an attorney with Kirkpatrick & Lockhart in Washington, D.C.).
167. See Johnson, supra note 151, at 46.
168. Toufexis, supra note 150.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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the interview [with the defendant] only or everything except the interview as a
means of getting to the truth, I’d prefer everything except the interview because
it would get me to the truth more often.”171
Dietz’s apparent stress on facts,172 combined with what even Rappeport
views as a “rigid” approach towards defendants,173 has prompted criticism. Ac-
cording to an article about Dietz in Johns Hopkins Magazine, “[s]ome forensic
psychiatrists” have accused him of presenting “mere informed opinion as solid
fact, and [complain] that his standard of criminal responsibility is harsh and un-
forgiving of mentally ill defendants.”174 For example, during his testimony in the
Yates case, Dietz indicated that because Andrea claimed that Satan, rather than
God, told her to kill her children, she knew her actions were wrong.175 Andrea
also failed to act in a way a loving mother would if she really thought she was
saving her children from hell by killing them. As Dietz stated, “I would expect
her to comfort the children, telling them they are going to be with Jesus or be
with God, but she does not offer words of comfort to the children.”176 However,
there appears to be no empirical support for this kind of interpretation of the
deific decree doctrine, if in fact that is what Dietz was referencing.177 Rather, if
Dietz’s explanation has any source at all, it seems to derive from the centuries-
old, Judeo-Christian origins of the doctrine itself.178 As one legal critic asked in
response to Dietz’s comments, “Is one to infer that it is somehow more loving to
invoke the name of Jesus while you drown your children than to drown them
without any religious commentary?”179  In other words, Dietz appears to be
stressing religion, not facts, a focus more aligned with Southern Bible belt cul-
ture180 rather than with a medical assessment of Andrea’s mental state.
Even Dietz’s supporters have admitted that his inflexible approach may
prevent him from being able (or willing) to comprehend “some of the psycho-
logical nuances of human behavior.”181 According to Rappeport, a strong advo-
cate,182 Dietz has the capability to understand and apply knowledge of human
behavior, he simply chooses not to.183 As Rappeport explained, “I have a suspi-
cion he may not like to do that. So he may find himself more frequently on the
side of the prosecutor, who doesn’t like to do those things either.”184  Such an
omission is a troubling handicap in a field where “[f]ifty percent or more of
171. Id.
172. See Johnson, supra note 151, at 48.
173. See id.
174. See Keiger, supra note 164.
175. See App. 4 at 109, tr. at 86; see also Associated Press, Doctor: Yates Suffered Mental Illness, Mar.
8, 2002, available at http://www.courttv.com/trials/yates/030802-illness_ap.html.
176. See App. 4 at 114, tr. at 106.
177. Morris & Haroun, supra note 95, at 1003.
178. See id.
179. Susan Jacoby, Needed: Guilty but Insane Option, NEWSDAY, Mar. 14, 2002, at A35.
180. Steiker, supra note 9, at 124-25; see also Professor to Discuss Death Penalty, SAN ANGELO
STANDARD-TIMES, Jan. 14, 2003, at A3 (referring to the Bible belt culture in Texas).
181. See Johnson, supra note 151, at 48.
182. See id. at 46 (noting that Rappeport “recalls that when he discovered Dietz at Hopkins his
feeling was one of ‘love at first sight,’ for ‘Park consumed books, consumed information’”).
183. See id. at 48.
184. Id.
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medicine is emotional.”185 It is particularly problematic given that the cases that
typically involve Dietz’s testimony often turn on the very “nuances” that Dietz
discounts.
Indeed, in media interviews186 and his testimony in the Yates case,187 Dietz
has made clear that he does not treat patients in a psychiatry practice.  This lack
of engagement with patients is “rare” among medical expert witnesses.188 Rather,
Dietz opts to concentrate on research and one-time interviews with criminal de-
fendants.189  Yet, such a view of the psychiatric world is distorted. For example, it
is difficult to comprehend how Dietz can evaluate an individual’s normality or
abnormality if he only engages in short-term interviews with highly abnormal
people. By encountering briefly only the most extreme criminal cases, all Dietz
sees is pathology. He has no “control group” as a comparison, no in-depth
evaluations of individuals from whom he can learn nuances. Such an approach
may explain additional criticisms concerning where Dietz draws the line for
distinguishing sanity from insanity. According to Fred S. Berlin, associate pro-
fessor of psychiatry at Johns Hopkins and one of the defense’s psychiatric ex-
perts in the Jeffrey Dahmer case, Dietz’s line is too stringent. “He has a high
threshold for evidence that tends to suggest impairment. A narrow range for
what he defines as psychiatric disorder.”190
Consistent with this view, in the Yates case Dietz minimized the defense
expert witnesses’ testimony that Andrea had suffered years of delusions, audi-
tory hallucinations, and visions of violence.191 Instead, Dietz claimed that Andrea
had, at most, experienced “obsessional intrusive thoughts.”192 Yet, contrary to
other high profile defendants pleading insanity, Andrea had a substantial and
documented history of mental illness before she killed her children.193  Not only
had she twice attempted suicide, she had also been hospitalized and prescribed
anti-psychotic drugs after the birth of her fourth and fifth children.194 The de-
185. Id. For further discussion of the significance of understanding and applying knowledge of
human behavior in the field of psychiatry, see generally WILLARD GAYLIN, THE KILLING OF BONNIE
GARLAND 252 (1982) (explaining that two key axioms of psychiatry are, first, that “[e]very individual
act of human behavior is the resultant of a multitude of emotional forces and counterforces” and,
second, “[t]hese forces and counterforces are shaped by past experience”).
186. See Johnson, supra note 151, at 43, 48 (noting that although Dietz’s colleagues often have
clinical practices, Dietz “himself has no interest in treating patients” and that “Park never treats any-
body and has no qualms about it”).
187. See generally App. 4.
188. Ciccone, Expert Testimony, supra note 42, at 798.  Commentators on psychiatric expert testi-
mony emphasize  the importance of psychiatric experts engaging in a clinical practice:
The medical expert witness usually engages in [testifying] as a part of a larger clinical
practice. While some experts have given up clinical work, this is rare. Medical experts who
have not actively engaged in their discipline or who have given it up may find their credi-
bility questioned in court. Medical experts have the ethical obligation to inform the court
or attorney hiring them of the status of their clinical practice.
Id.
189. See Toufexis, supra note 150.
190. Keiger, supra note 164.
191. See App. 4 at 105, tr. at 68-70.
192. See id., tr. at 69.
193. See App. 1 (June 17, 1999; July 21, 1999; Mar. 31, 2001; May 4, 2001) at 62, 64, 67-68.
194. See id. (June 17, 1999; June 19, 1999; July 20, 1999; Mar. 31, 2001) at 62-64, 67-68.
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fense could call experts who had actually treated Andrea, some repeatedly,195 in
sharp contrast to Dietz’s relatively brief interview. As one scholar on expert tes-
timony emphasizes, “[t]he legal system assumes that the treating doctor is more
credible than a nontreating doctor”; therefore, the treating physician “is fre-
quently sought to provide expert testimony.”196
Nonetheless, Dietz’s effectiveness as a witness appears to be due to his al-
leged emphasis on fact. Because jurors received conflicting expert testimony
during the Yates trial, minimal statutory guidance, and unclear stories from both
the prosecution and defense, they were left with little to rely on other than the
supposed “facts.”197  Compounding this dilemma, the multiple defense psychia-
trists gave somewhat contradictory analyses of Andrea’s mental state,198 pre-
sumably in part because she had been treated or assessed by a number of them
during different stages of her illness. Such a multiple-theory defense narrative
contrasted with the more uniform “factual” narrative presented by Dietz. Given
a choice, Dietz’s story may have been the preferred alternative; the jury could
base a decision on something tangible—“facts”—rather than confusion.
2. A Prosecutorial Bent
Almost immediately, Dietz’s testimony and post-trial commentary about
the Yates case sparked notoriety for the views he expressed both inside and out-
side the courtroom. In an interview with the New York Times six weeks after his
trial testimony, Dietz stressed that his involvement in the Yates case was “trou-
bling,” both “professionally and personally.”199 As he explained, “[i]t was obvi-
ous where public opinion lay, it was obvious she was mentally ill, it was obvi-
ous where professional organizations would like the case to go.”200 Therefore,
while “[i]t would have been the easier course of action to distort the law a little,
ignore the evidence a little, and pretend she didn’t know what she did was
wrong,” it also would have been “wrong . . . to stretch the truth and try to engi-
neer the outcome” in that way.201
Dietz also tried to justify his career-long tendency to appear primarily for
the prosecution. According to Dietz, prosecutors, like good forensic psychia-
trists, strive “to seek truth and justice” and therefore to make available all the
information important in a case.202 In contrast, defense attorneys attempt to help
their clients—a goal that conflicts with a thorough search for data. “[O]ften there
are pieces of evidence that are not in their client’s interest to have disclosed or
195. See id. (Andrea met with Dr. Flack throughout the period of June 19, 1999 to June 24, 1999;
Dr. Starbranch from July 1, 1999 to Jan. 2000; and Dr. Saeed from Apr. 1, 2001 to June 18, 2001) at 62-
70.
196. Ciccone, Expert Testimony, supra note 42, at 797.
197. See Cassel, supra note 84.
198. See infra notes 461-69.
199. See Toufexis, supra note 150.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.; see also Keiger, supra note 164 (noting that Dietz “almost always appears in court as a
witness for the prosecution”); Interview: Dr. Park Dietz, supra note 148 (commenting on how Dietz’s
approach benefits prosecutors).
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produced.”203 Of course, Dietz’s statements imply that defense attorneys and
their witnesses want to distort information in some way and shield the truth.204
The irony of Dietz’s points, however, were spotlighted a week later by An-
drea’s attorneys. They discovered a factual error that Dietz had made during
cross-examination. As the next section discusses, their research showed that
Dietz had testified incorrectly about the existence of a television episode about
postpartum depression that never aired.205
3. A Mistake in Testimony
Dietz is a technical advisor to two television shows: Law & Order and Law
& Order Criminal Intent. In his advisory capacity, he has viewed nearly three
hundred episodes of both shows.206  During the Yates trial, Dietz mistakenly tes-
tified that, shortly before Andrea killed her children, Law & Order aired an epi-
sode involving a postpartum depressed mother who successfully won an insan-
ity appeal after drowning her children in a bathtub.207 The episode never
existed.208 When Dietz learned of his error, he wrote prosecutors Joe Owmby and
Kaylynn Williford and informed them that he had confused the insanity episode
he testified about with other Law & Order episodes and infanticide cases.
Dietz’s mistake about such a fact, however, may be part of the grounds for
Yates’s appeal.209 It is not a stretch to think the jury may have been affected by
Dietz’s implication that Andrea was somehow influenced by the show.
Dietz’s statements about the “truth seeking” differences between the prose-
cution and the defense were also problematic in other ways totally beyond his
control and, presumably, his awareness. For example, trial testimony revealed
that the defense was not able to acquire copies of particular documents, includ-
ing Andrea’s police offense report. George Parnham, Andrea’s attorney, was al-
lowed only to read her police report but not to photocopy it.210  Therefore, Parn-
ham resorted to taking notes on the report, based only on what he could
remember of it. As one defense expert later revealed, having only Parnham’s
notes on Andrea’s report put the expert “at a real disadvantage.”211
Dietz also claimed that the defense experts asked “shocking examples of
leading questions” of Andrea and provided only partial, and biased, videotapes
of their interviews with her.212 Predictably, his accusation prompted a response.
According to Lucy Puryear, a Houston psychiatrist who testified for Andrea’s
203. Toufexis, supra note 150.
204. Christian, supra note 153.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See App. 4 at 127, tr. at 161.
208. Christian, supra note 153.
209. Andrew Gumbel, Life Sentence for Texan Mother Who Drowned Her Five Children; Andrea Yates:
A History of Mental Health Problems, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Mar. 16, 2002, at 18 (explaining that
Dietz’s mistake about the Law & Order episode might be an issue on appeal and that Joseph
Owmby, the lead prosecutor, “insinuated that Mrs. Yates—a fan of the show—might have hatched a
plot for infanticide based on what she saw on TV”).
210. See App. 4 at 130, tr. at 171.
211. Christian, supra note 153.
212. See Toufexis, supra note 150.
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defense, Dietz did the same.213 Puryear added that Dietz edited his eight hours of
videotaped interviews with Andrea and only “showed the jury portions that
supported his testimony.”214
Such media debates simply seem to accentuate the general problems asso-
ciated with incorporating psychiatric testimony in an adversarial process, as
well as the weaknesses of the profession itself. Legal commentators emphasized
the extent to which both sides in the Yates case differed in their conclusions
about Andrea’s mental state given that they were purportedly examining the
same evidence.215 As the following sections suggest, however, the backgrounds
of the experts appeared to have an impact on what kind of evidence they be-
lieved was most significant and why.
B. Dietz’s Limitations in Expertise and Investigation
This section examines the extent of Park Dietz’s background and experi-
ence for testifying in a case involving a defendant with an undisputed history of
postpartum depression and postpartum psychosis. As one scholar on expert
witnesses has emphasized, “[m]edical professionals who undertake the role of
expert witnesses are generally expected . . . to be knowledgeable and experi-
enced in the area in which they are functioning as a medical expert.”216
1. Postpartum Depression and Postpartum Psychosis
The Yates trial revealed the degree to which Dietz was unfamiliar with pa-
tients diagnosed with postpartum depression or postpartum psychosis and his
admitted void in treating patients.217 This observation is not meant to elevate the
psychiatric classification of postpartum disorders to a level of scientific precision
and sophistication that it does not deserve.218 Rather, this section makes clear
that there is still much to be learned about postpartum disorders and how much
they can justifiably mitigate criminal culpability, if at all. At the same time, what
is known medically about the disorders—especially their neurobiological as-
pects—should not be ignored.  Two postpartum experts highlighted the prob-
lem of such informational inadequacy specifically with respect to the prosecu-
tion’s approach in the Yates case: “The real challenge for psychiatry is to educate
the legal profession and juries about the physiological underpinnings of post-
partum disorders and other psychoses . . . and, ultimately, to encourage verdicts
based on facts.”219
Of course, Park Dietz was not responsible for such a lack of education. It is
not the role of the expert witness to provide answers to questions that are never
asked or to draw conclusions without a foundation. Andrea’s defense attorneys
could have more aggressively revealed Dietz’s gaps and confronted him with
213. Christian, supra note 153.
214. Id.
215. See infra Part VI.A., The Overall Defense and Prosecution Perspective, and accompanying
notes.
216. Ciccone, Expert Testimony, supra note 42, at 797.
217. See supra notes 186-90 and accompanying text.
218. See infra notes 230-33 and accompanying text.
219. Meyer & Spinelli, supra note 77, at 176.
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the history of Andrea’s illnesses that Dietz bypassed in his evaluations. None-
theless, without a fuller expertise on postpartum issues, Dietz’s story about An-
drea offered a much simpler mental landscape—and a greater level of specula-
tion—than may have been warranted given her background.
Direct and cross examinations in the Yates trial made clear that Dietz has
been asked to consult on an “unusually high proportion” of cases concerning
mothers who kill their children.220 Yet, according to his testimony, the last time
he ever treated a female patient with postpartum depression was twenty-five
years ago (in 1977).221 Nor was Dietz “sure” that he ever treated a patient for
postpartum depression with “psychotic features.”222  Dietz conceded that he
stopped treating patients totally “many many years ago,” in “1981 or 1982”223
and that he has no expertise in women’s mental health.224 Dietz’s error concern-
ing the showing of a Law & Order episode on postpartum depression225 came
about when Parnham was cross-examining him to assess two issues: the sources
of Dietz’s income, but also whether Dietz had any more expertise in postpartum
disorders, even at the level of consulting for television shows, than what he in-
dicated in his testimony on direct examination.226  It appears Dietz did not have
more background because he did not offer any information other than his con-
sultancy on a nonexistent show. Such inexperience does not comport with ac-
cepted diagnostic principles of psychiatry.227
Dietz’s lack of expertise in postpartum depression and postpartum psycho-
sis is striking given the psychiatric community’s recognition of postpartum dis-
orders228 and the acceptance by both sides that Andrea was afflicted with one.229
The disorders are included in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Dis-
orders (DSM), published by the American Psychiatric Association, and now in its
fourth (text revised) edition (DSM-IV-TR).230 As courts and professionals have
noted, “[t]he DSM is often referred to as ‘the psychiatric profession’s diagnostic
Bible.’”231 DSM-IV-TR also clearly recognizes the link between postpartum-
related mental disorder and infanticide in the context of delusions.232 Notably,
220. See App. 4 at 99, tr. at 21. Although the transcript reads "usually high proportion," it is logi-
cal to assume that Dietz either meant to say "unusually high" or said "unusually high" and the tran-
script omitted the "un."
221. See id. at 124, tr. at 148.
222. See id., tr. at 149.
223. See id., tr. at 148.
224. See id. at 125-26, tr. at 154.
225. See supra notes 206-09 and accompanying text.
226. See App. 4 at 127, tr. at 161.
227. See generally JAMES MORRISON & RODRIGO A. MUNOZ, BOARDING TIME: A PSYCHIATRY
CANDIDATE’S GUIDE TO PART II OF THE ABPN EXAMINATION (2d ed. 1996) (advising candidates to
avoid discussing with examiners diagnoses of which they have no knowledge or experience).
228. See infra note 232.
229. See supra notes 16, 116, 144 and accompanying text.
230. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 124, at xxiii. The DSM, first published in 1952, has had periodic revi-
sions, starting in 1968 (DSM-II), 1980 (DSM-III), 1987 (DSM-III-R), 1994 (DSM-IV), and 2000 (DSM-
IV-TR). Id. at xxiv-vi.
231. Morris & Haroun, supra note 95, at 1023 (citations omitted).
232. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 124, at 422-23. As one legal commentator explains, symptoms of
postpartum psychosis typically include delusions and hallucinations. The “plasticity” of the psycho-
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however, postpartum psychosis is not presently treated as an individual diag-
nostic classification in the DSM-IV-TR. Rather, the symptoms are categorized ac-
cording to the established criteria used to diagnose psychosis (for example, ma-
jor depressive, manic, or mixed episode). The “postpartum onset specifier”
applies if symptoms occur within four weeks after childbirth.233
2. Andrea’s Postpartum Risk Factors and Life Stressors
It appears that Dietz never really adequately investigated or acknowledged
Andrea’s postpartum risk factors—most particularly in the context of the post-
partum period’s “unique . . . degree of neuroendocrine alterations and psycho-
social adjustments,” which the DSM emphasizes.234 In other words, the medical
literature stresses that the risk factors for postpartum disorders cover a broad
scope of biological, psychological, and social influences. These factors include an
individual’s personal and family history of depression, biochemical imbalances,
recent stressful events, marital conflict, and perceived lack of support from the
partner, family, or friends.235
sis is manifested by the pattern of its symptoms—“delusions and hallucinations may abruptly sur-
face, followed by periods of deep depression, only to be replaced with psychoses.” Judith Macfar-
lane, Criminal Defense in Cases of Infanticide and Neonaticide, in Spinelli, supra note 43, at 133, 136.  By
the time psychiatric evaluations and trials occur, many defendants have suffered memory loss dur-
ing the psychosis and are unable to even describe to a psychiatrist or jury what their thought proc-
esses were at the time of the crime. Id. at 163-64.  Yet, the psychosis has passed, so defendants can be
found competent to stand trial. Meyer & Spinelli, supra note 77, at 173.
233. Misri et al., Postpartum Psychosis, supra note 43.  The DSM-IV-TR classification for “Postpar-
tum Onset Specifier” is as follows:
Symptoms that are common in postpartum-onset episodes, though not specific to post-
partum onset, include fluctuations in mood, mood lability, and preoccupation with infant
well-being, the intensity of which may range from overconcern to frank delusions. The
presence of severe ruminations or delusional thoughts about the infant is associated with a
significantly increased risk of harm to the infant.
Postpartum-onset mood episodes can present either with or without psychotic fea-
tures. Infanticide is most often associated with postpartum psychotic episodes that are
characterized by command hallucinations to kill the infant or delusions that the infant is
possessed, but it can also occur in severe postpartum mood episodes without such specific
delusions or hallucinations. Postpartum mood (Major Depressive, Manic, or Mixed) epi-
sodes with psychotic features appear to occur in from 1 in 500 to 1 in 1,000 deliveries and
may be more common in primiparous women. The risk of postpartum episodes with psy-
chotic features is particularly increased for women with prior postpartum mood episodes
but is also elevated for those with a prior history of a Mood Disorder (especially Bipolar I
Disorder). Once a woman has had a postpartum episode with psychotic features, the risk
of occurrence with each subsequent delivery is between 30% and 50%. There is also some
evidence of increased risk of postpartum psychotic mood episodes among women without
a history of Mood Disorders with a family history of Bipolar Disorders. . . .
A past personal history of nonpostpartum Mood Disorder and a family history of
Mood Disorders also increase the risk for the development of a postpartum Mood Disor-
der. The risk factors, recurrence rates, and symptoms of postpartum-onset Mood Episodes
are similar to those of nonpostpartum Mood Episodes. However, the postpartum period is
unique with respect to the degree of neuroendocrine alterations and psychosocial adjust-
ments, the potential impact of breast-feeding on treatment planning, and the long-term
implications of a history of postpartum Mood Disorder on subsequent family planning.
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 124, at 422-23.
234. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 124, at 423.
235. Misri et al., Postpartum Psychosis, supra note 43; Misri et al., Postpartum Blues, supra note 43.
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Andrea experienced all of the postpartum risk factors that the DSM men-
tions.236 She was also subject to a host of family and environmental life stressors
shown to be linked to postpartum depression and postpartum psychosis.237 Dietz
only occasionally alluded to these stressors if he mentioned them at all in his
testimony. Even if it could be argued that the direct and cross examinations of
Dietz did not prompt further references to Andrea’s disorders, it would be ex-
pected that they would be part of Dietz’s evaluation of Andrea independent of
his courtroom testimony.
Andrea’s stressors were numerous. First, over the course of her marriage to
Rusty (during which she was nearly always either pregnant or breastfeeding),
Andrea consistently demonstrated DSM-listed criteria for postpartum mood
disorder: “fluctuations in mood, mood lability, and preoccupation with infant
well-being.”238 Like the DSM specification, these feelings “ranged from overcon-
cern to frank delusions”239 and they also took the form of suicide attempts re-
lated to the other circumstances in Andrea’s life—uprooted living conditions
and transiency, home schooling her five children, her father’s death, depressive
illnesses throughout her family, Rusty’s own bizarre behavior and pressure for
more children, as well as Andrea’s increasing obsession with religious doctrine,
particularly as it was pitched by Michael Woroniecki and his wife, Rachel.240 As
the DSM notes, “[t]he presence of severe ruminations or delusional thoughts
about the infant is associated with a significantly increased risk of harm to the
infant.”241  Part IV considers in further detail how Andrea wove such delusional
thoughts into a highly stressed life that seemed to spur the thoughts all the
more.
IV.  ANDREA YATES’S HISTORY OF  POSTPARTUM DISORDERS
A. The Early Years of Andrea’s Marriage
Andrea’s postpartum difficulties appeared with her first pregnancy. Soon
after Noah’s birth in 1994,242 for example, Andrea experienced hallucinations—a
striking vision of a knife and her stabbing someone. She dismissed the image
and never revealed it to anyone243until after her arrest, when she told Rusty.244 As
research shows, postpartum depressed or psychotic women often feel ashamed
or embarrassed to admit to others their thoughts about harming their infants.245
When Andrea became pregnant a second time in 1995 (with John), she gave
up swimming and jogging and also saw less of her friends.246 Her lifestyle
236. See supra note 233.
237. See infra Part IV. Andrea Yates’s History of Postpartum Disorders, and accompanying notes.
238. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 124, at 422.
239. Id.
240. See Roche, supra note 1, at 48. See generally App. 1.
241. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 124, at 422.
242. See App. 1 (Feb. 26, 1994) at 61.
243. See id.
244. See Roche, supra note 1, at 45-46.
245. See Meyer & Spinelli, supra note 77, at 181; Misri et al., Postpartum Blues, supra note 43.
246. See App. 1 (Dec. 15, 1995) at 61.
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switched yet again in 1996, when Rusty was offered work on a six-month
NASA-related project in Florida—an event that prompted the leasing of their
four-bedroom suburban house and a drive to Florida in a thirty-eight foot
trailer.247 That trailer would become their “home” in a recreational-vehicle com-
munity where Andrea would care for Noah and John while Rusty worked.248 In
Florida, Andrea miscarried but then became pregnant a third time just when
Rusty had completed his job and was ready to move back to Houston.249
The return to Houston did not mean re-inhabiting their house even though
in 1997 Andrea gave birth to a third child, Paul.250 Rusty had other ideas. In an
effort to live “light” and “easy,” the Yateses rented a lot for their trailer.251 By
1998, after several months of trailer living, Rusty’s “easy living” philosophy took
a new twist. He learned that a traveling evangelist, Michael Woroniecki, whose
advice had inspired Rusty in college, was selling a motor home that Woroniecki
had converted from a 1978 Greyhound bus.252 Woroniecki, his wife Rachel, and
their children had used the 350-square feet of bus for home and travel for their
mobile lifestyle.253 Because Andrea and Noah preferred the bus to the trailer,
Rusty bought it. Noah and John slept in the luggage compartment, while An-
drea, Rusty, Paul, and now, Luke, who was born in 1999, slept in the cabin.254
While her brood expanded, Andrea also became devoted to helping her
father, who now had Alzheimer’s disease. This task was overwhelming for An-
drea.255 At the same time, Andrea became further isolated from everyone. When
she did choose to see people, she always visited them, never reciprocating by
inviting them to the trailer.256
Rusty’s role in Andrea’s increasing aloneness, oddity of lifestyle, religious
obsession, and continual state of pregnancy should not be downplayed with re-
spect to any facet of Andrea’s behavior.257 And it may never be known to what
extent Andrea’s pregnancies were based on a mutual decision with Rusty or
primarily a product of Rusty’s desire for a large family. A number of people, in-
cluding Andrea’s mother and her friend Debbie Holmes, suggested Rusty was a
dominating force in the Yates family, including the decision to have babies.258
247. See id. (Early-mid 1996) at 61.
248. See id. (Early-mid 1996, Oct. 12, 1996, Nov. 1996, Dec. 1996) at 61.
249. See id. (Nov. 1996, Dec. 1996) at 61.
250. See id. (Sept. 13, 1997) at 61.
251. See id. (May 1998) at 62.
252. See id.
253. See id.
254. See id. (Oct. 1998, Feb. 15, 1999) at 62.
255. See id. (Mar. - May 1999) at 62.
256. See id.
257. Indeed, at one point the Harris County district attorney was examining whether Rusty was
in any way culpable for the killings because he had left Andrea alone with the children. See Associ-
ated Press, DA Looks at Russell Yates’ Conduct, Mar. 26, 2002, available at http://www.courttv.com/
trials/yates/032602_ap.html.
258. See infra notes 299-301 and accompanying text; see also Roche, supra note 1, at 48.
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B. The Start of Andrea’s Breakdown
On June 16, 1999, Andrea called Rusty at work, sobbing and hysterical. He
returned to find her shaking uncontrollably and biting her fingers.259 His efforts
to calm her to no avail, Rusty took Andrea to her parents’ home that evening.260
The next day, while Andrea’s mother was napping and Rusty was out doing er-
rands, the full force of Andrea’s troubles became unmistakably clear. She at-
tempted suicide by taking forty pills of her mother’s antidepressant medica-
tion.261 An unconscious Andrea was rushed by ambulance to Methodist Hospital,
with Rusty following behind.262
Andrea told the staff at Methodist Hospital that she had consumed the pills
to “sleep forever,” but afterwards she felt guilty because she had her “family to
live for.”263 At the same time, her recovery was slow. According to notes taken
by a hospital psychiatrist and a social worker, Andrea was evasive about the
reasons for her suicide attempt and deflected questions.264 Although Andrea was
still depressed, the hospital discharged her for “insurance reasons,” the expla-
nation written on her medical chart. The psychiatrist prescribed Zoloft, an anti-
depressant, and Rusty took Andrea back to her parents’ home to rest.265
Andrea did not like taking the medication, however, and her condition
only worsened.266 She would stay in bed all day and self-mutilate. At one point,
she scratched four bald patches on her scalp, picked sores in her nose, and ob-
sessively scraped “score marks” on her legs and arms.267 Later, she would tell
psychiatrists that during this time, she saw visions and heard voices, telling her
to get a knife.  She also watched a person being stabbed, although she would not
identify the victim.268 At the same time, Andrea refused to feed her children or
nurse her baby Luke, claiming that they were “all eating too much.”269 Such de-
lusions and thoughts about her children are consistent with the criteria listed for
postpartum disorders in the DSM.270
It was only after Andrea’s attempted suicide that her relatives discovered
the extent of her family history of mental illness: Andrea’s brother and sister had
ongoing treatment for depression, another brother was bipolar, and in hind-
sight, her father also suffered from depression.271  According to the DSM, this
259. See App. 1 (June 16, 1999) at 62.
260. See id.
261. See id. (June 17, 1999) at 62.
262. See id.
263. See id. (June 18, 1999) at 62.
264. See id.
265. See id. (June 19, 1999, June 20, 1999, June 21, 1999, June 22, 1999, June 23, 1999, June 24, 1999)
at 62-63.
266. See id. (June 18, 1999, July 1, 1999, July 2-19, 1999) at 62-64.
267. See id. (July 2-19, 1999) at 63-64.
268. See id.
269. See id.
270. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 124, at 422.
271. See App. 1 (July 2-19, 1999) at 63-64.
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family history of mental disorder (particularly bipolar disorder),272 along with
Andrea’s pre- and post-pregnancy experiences with depression,273 are all factors
that would heighten the likelihood of postpartum psychotic features. As the
DSM explains, “[o]nce a woman has had a postpartum episode with psychotic
features, the risk of recurrence with each subsequent delivery is between 30%
and 50%.”274
At different times, Andrea also experienced bizarre delusions and halluci-
nations. She believed that there were video cameras in the ceilings watching her
in various rooms in the house and that television characters were communicat-
ing with her. She told Rusty of these hallucinations; however, neither of them
informed Andrea’s doctors, even though Andrea was continually asked whether
she had hallucinations.275
Of all of her family members, Andrea seemed to suffer the most and her
condition continued to deteriorate. The day before she had an appointment with
one of her psychiatrists, Eileen Starbranch, Rusty found Andrea in the bathroom
looking at the mirror with a knife at her throat. Rusty had to grab the knife
away.276 When Rusty told Starbranch of the incident, she insisted that Andrea be
hospitalized again, this time at Memorial Spring Shadows Glen, a private facility
in Houston.277
The initial results of this hospitalization were disastrous. Andrea was vir-
tually catatonic for ten days.278 According to clinicians, catatonia is an objective
sign of mental disorder whether or not an individual reveals what he or she is
thinking.279 It was also only during Andrea’s stay at Memorial Spring Shadows
Glen that there would ever be any record suggesting that she experienced hallu-
272. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 124, at 423 (“There is also some evidence of increased risk of post-
partum psychotic mood episodes among women without a history of Mood Disorders with a family
history of Bipolar Disorders.”); see also supra note 235 and accompanying text.
273. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 124, at 422 (“The risk of postpartum episodes with psychotic fea-
tures is particularly increased for women with prior postpartum mood episodes but is also elevated
for those with a prior history of a Mood Disorder (especially Bipolar I Disorder).”).
274. Id. at 423.
275. See App. 1 (July 2-19, 1999) at 63-64.
276. See id. (July 20, 1999) at 64.
277. See id. (July 21, 1999) at 64.
278. See id. (July 25, 1999) at 64.
279. Telephone Interview with Shari Lusskin, M.D., Director of Reproductive Psychiatry, Clinical
Assistant Professor, New York University School of Medicine (Dec. 15, 2002). Under the DSM, the
criteria for catatonic features specifier include a clinical picture dominated by at least two of the fol-
lowing features:
(1) motoric immobility as evidenced by catalepsy (including waxy flexibility) or stupor
(2) excessive motor activity (that is apparently purposeless and not influenced by external
stimuli)
(3) extreme negativism (an apparently motiveless resistance to all instructions or mainte-
nance of a rigid posture against attempts to be moved) or mutism
(4) peculiarities of voluntary movement as evidenced by posturing (voluntary assumption
of inappropriate or bizarre postures), stereotyped movements, prominent mannerisms, or
prominent grimacing
(5) echolalia or echopraxia
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 124, at 418.
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cinations.280 This record was based on a doctor’s report and observations by the
doctor’s assistant.281
Starbranch gave Andrea a multi-drug injection that immediately improved
Andrea’s behavior, according to Rusty.282 After a sound sleep, Andrea seemed
much more like the person he had first met and they had in the evening what he
thought was one of their best conversations.283 Only later did Andrea assert that
she considered the injection a “truth serum” that led her to lose self-control in a
way she abhorred.284 Andrea’s view of the injection as a “truth serum” could be
considered yet one more bizarre delusion on her part.285
When Andrea returned to her family after treatment, “home” was neither
her parents’ house (which was too small) nor the bus, which her parents consid-
ered unhealthy for her and the children. With her parents’ urging, Rusty, a well-
salaried ($80,000 a year) project manager at NASA, bought a three-bedroom,
two-bath house in a tree-lined, residential neighborhood.286  The house even had
a place to park the bus, which was still very important to Rusty. In the more se-
rene surroundings, Andrea apparently prospered—swimming laps at dawn,
baking and sewing, playing with her children, and fostering an environment for
home schooling,287 which Rusty encouraged despite the past stress on Andrea.288
At this point, Andrea admitted to Rusty that she had “failed” at their life in the
bus; this new phase in their life was a chance to succeed.289
During this period, the family was engaging in three nights per week of Bi-
ble study in the living room because Rusty did not like any of the churches in
their area.  Again, the views of the bus-selling traveling minister Michael Woro-
niecki would come to have a profound effect on the lives of Andrea and Rusty.290
Through Woroniecki, Rusty came to doubt organized religion, even though
Rusty was not in complete agreement with Woroniecki’s views.291 Andrea was
another story, however. Woroniecki’s “repent-or-burn zeal”292 captivated her
and she corresponded with Woroniecki and his wife for years after she and
Rusty bought their bus.293 Indeed, at times, the Yates family seemed to imitate
the Woronieckis—a bus-living, home-schooling, Bible-reading brood relishing
the isolation of itinerancy.294  According to Woroniecki, “the role of woman is de-
rived . . . from the sin of Eve.”295 Likewise, he thought that “bad mothers” create
280. See App. 1 (July 27-28, 1999) at 64-65.
281. See id. (July 27-28, 1999 n.61) at 77.
282. Roche, supra note 1, at 47.
283. See App. 1 (July 28, 1999) at 65; Roche, supra note 1, at 47.
284. Roche, supra note 1, at 47.
285. Telephone interview with Shari Lusskin, M.D., supra note 279.
286. See App. 1 (Aug. 9, 1999) at 66.
287. See id. (Dec. 14, 1999) at 67.
288. See id.
289. See id.
290. See id. (Early-mid 1996-Oct. 1998) at 61-62.
291. See Roche, supra note 1, at 48.
292. Id.
293. See App. 1 (Oct. 1998) at 62.
294. See id. (Early-mid 1996 n.11) at 75.
295. See Roche, supra note 1, at 48.
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“bad children.”296  There came a time when Woroniecki’s “hell burning” influ-
ence on Andrea was so great, it distressed both her parents and even Rusty.297
By the spring of 2000, Andrea became pregnant again, a decision seemingly
made with Rusty when Andrea started to improve so markedly.298 Yet, the news
greatly alarmed Starbranch, who had warned that Andrea’s problems could be
far more serious if they returned,299 as well as Andrea’s mother, who had be-
lieved all along that Rusty’s demands prompted Andrea’s breakdown.300 Debbie
Holmes, a former nursing colleague of Andrea’s, echoed this view of Rusty,
claiming that Andrea continually depicted Rusty as manipulative and control-
ling and that Rusty pushed her to have the fifth baby.301
C. Andrea’s Plunge into Mental Illness
Starbranch’s predictions rang true. Andrea’s pregnancy was met by an-
other downward dive into mental illness, this time precipitated by the death of
Andrea’s father.302 Andrea also became more absorbed with the teachings of the
Bible.303  The effects of the traumatic circumstances surrounding her father’s
death were obvious: Andrea stopped talking; she would continually hold Mary
but not feed her; she would not drink liquids; she scratched and picked at her
scalp until she started to become bald again.304
On March 31, 2001, four months after Mary’s birth,305 Rusty sought to re-
hospitalize Andrea, with Starbranch’s urging.  This time, Rusty took Andrea to
the Devereux Texas Treatment Center Network,306 a trip that Andrea adamantly
resisted.307 Only with much prodding from Rusty and her brother did Andrea
finally agree to go to the hospital. Once there, she refused to sign forms admit-
ting herself. Because he thought Andrea’s condition was dangerous, her at-
tending psychiatrist, Mohammed Saeed,308 initiated the process of requesting
that a state judge confine Andrea to Austin State Hospital.309 Only after Rusty’s
continual pleading did Andrea finally agree to sign the forms admitting herself
to Devereux.310
Saeed’s account of Andrea’s condition appeared to be based entirely on
Rusty’s description rather than from Andrea’s treating psychiatrists or from
Andrea herself who, Saeed said, rarely spoke.311 When Rusty insisted that Saeed
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. See App. 1 (Mar. 2000) at 67.
299. See id.
300. See id. (Mar. 2000 n.93) at 78; see also Roche, supra note 1, at 48.
301. See App. 1 (Mar. 2000 n.93) at 78; see also Roche, supra note 1, at 48.
302. See App. 1 (Mar. 12, 2001) at 67.
303. See id. (Mar. 12, 2001 n.95) at 79; see also Roche, supra note 1, at 48.
304. See App. 1 (Mar. 13-30, 2001) at 67.
305. See id. (Mary was born on November 30, 2000) at 67.





311. See id. (Apr. 2, 2001, Apr. 5, 2001, Apr. 9, 2001 n.109) at 68, 79.
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put Andrea on Haldol,312 a drug that had been helpful to her in the past, Saeed
complied.313 Saeed discontinued the treatment shortly thereafter because, he
said, her “flat face” seemed to be a side effect.314 Later, Saeed would testify that,
based on the little Andrea said, she did not seem psychotic, never described the
torment she was going through, and denied experiencing hallucinations and
delusions.315
After ten days at Devereux, Andrea finally started feeding herself again—a
behavioral improvement which, in Saeed’s opinion, justified discharging her
even though her medication regime was still not stable.316 Also, Andrea wanted
to go home and Saeed thought that Rusty could take care of her.317
When Andrea returned home, Rusty’s mother, Dora, visited from Tennes-
see to help out during the day while she stayed at a motel in the evenings.318 Yet,
there were clear signals of Andrea’s desperate mental state. On May 3, for ex-
ample, after Andrea and Dora returned from taking the children for a walk,
Noah told Dora that he saw Andrea filling up the bathtub with water.319 When
Dora turned the water off and asked Andrea why she was running the water,
Andrea replied only, “[j]ust in case I need it.”320 Presumably, Andrea’s behavior
must have been quite unusual for such an (otherwise) innocuous event to have
garnered so much notice from Noah and Dora.321 Andrea also would not allow
her friend Debbie Holmes inside the house when Debbie stopped by to leave
food that afternoon. Later, Holmes stated that she thought Andrea had been re-
possessed by the Devil, an issue that both she and Andrea had discussed after
Andrea’s illness in 1999.322 This time, however, Debbie thought the “the demons
had returned a hundredfold.”323
Based upon what was happening, Andrea returned to Devereux for rehos-
pitalization. Again, Saeed was her chief caretaker.324 During her entire stay at
Devereux, Andrea was almost completely silent and lethargic, particularly
around Rusty. Apparently, in group sessions, Rusty dominated discussions and
always answered questions asked of Andrea, who would not even nod her
head.325 While on a combination of Haldol and antidepressants, Andrea stayed in
her room most of the time on fifteen-minute suicide checks.326 By May 14, Saeed
312. Haldol is used “in the management of manifestations of psychotic disorders.” PHYSICIAN’S
DESK REFERENCE 2534 (56th ed. 2002).
313. See App. 1 (Apr. 9, 2001 n.109) at 79.
314. See id.
315. See id. (Apr. 13, 2001 n.113) at 79-80.
316. See id. (Apr. 12, 2001) at 68.
317. See id. (Apr. 18, 2001) at 68.
318. Roche, supra note 1, at 49.
319. See App. 1 (May 3, 2001) at 68.
320. See id.
321. Telephone interview with Shari Lusskin, M.D., supra note 279.
322. See App. 1 (May 3, 2001 n.117) at 80; see also Roche, supra note 1, at 49.
323. See Roche, supra note 1, at 49.
324. See App. 1 (May 4, 2001) at 68.
325. See id. (May 5, 2001, May 10, 2001, May 14, 2001 n.126) at 69, 80; see also Roche, supra note 1,
at 49.
326. See Roche, supra note 1, at 49.
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suggested that she could go home. Although Andrea was still depressed and ba-
sically mute (apart from responding with her name when asked), her sleeping
and eating had greatly improved and she was no longer expressing suicidal
thoughts.327
On June 18, a month after Andrea’s release from Devereux and after six
days of outpatient therapy, Rusty and Andrea met with Saeed.328 Andrea’s
mental state was sharply declining.329 At that point, Andrea was off Haldol and
Saeed was experimenting with other drug combinations.330 As usual, Rusty an-
swered most of the questions addressed to Andrea, but he expressed deep con-
cern. Andrea was getting worse and was now having nightmares.331 Rusty asked
that Saeed reconsider applying shock therapy, a strategy Saeed declined, saying
it was for far more serious disorders.332 Also, Saeed did not want to re-prescribe
Haldol.333 Instead, he readjusted Andrea’s level of antidepressants, suggested
that she see a psychologist, rather than a psychiatrist, and, perhaps most strik-
ingly, “think positive thoughts.”334
The next afternoon, Andrea watched cartoons on television and then joined
Rusty and Noah for a quick round of basketball in the garage.335 Yet, moments
later, she returned inside and went to bed without changing her clothes.336 She
slept until the next morning, June 20, but had a nightmare during the night.337
She would not tell Rusty what the nightmare was about.338 That morning, while
Andrea set out cereal bowls and milk for breakfast, Rusty made sure that she
had swallowed her dose of antidepressants before he left for work.339 According
to Rusty, his last picture prior to the killings was one of seeing Andrea eating ce-
real from a box.340
D. Andrea’s Killings and The Aftermath
1. Andrea Drowns Her Children
From all accounts, Andrea started the drownings nearly as soon as Rusty
left because her children were still having breakfast.341 First, she selected “Perfect
Paul,” then three-years-old, apparently her greatest joy (and the “least trouble”)
327. See App. 1 (May 14, 2001) at 69.







335. Roche, supra note 1, at 50.
336. Id.
337. See App. 1 (June 19, 2001) at 70; see also Roche, supra note 1, at 50.
338. See Roche, supra note 1, at 50.
339. See App. 1 (June 20, 2001) at 70.
340. Roche, supra note 1, at 50.
341. See infra Appendix 3 at 89: Transcript of Andrea Yates’s Confession (June 20, 2001) [herein-
after App. 3]; see also Paul Burka, It’s Crazy, TEX. MONTHLY, July 2002, at 8 (examining Andrea’s con-
fession in light of the problems with, and possible alternatives to, the Texas insanity standard).
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of the five.342 Paul’s death took only seconds. She tucked his body in her bed and
laid his head on the pillow. Next came Luke (age two), John (age five), and then
Mary (age six months), who was nursing a bottle while Andrea was drowning
the others. Andrea left Mary in the tub.343
Seven-year-old Noah was still eating his cereal when Andrea asked him to
the bathroom.344 When he “saw his sister facedown in the water, he asked, ‘What
happened to Mary?’”345 Noah then tried to run away. But, Andrea ran after him,
dragging him back to the tub—struggling to drown him while he came up twice
for air. Afterwards, Andrea put Mary in the bed with her brothers, ensuring that
their arms were wrapped around their little sister.346 She left Noah in the tub.347
2. Andrea’s Confession
Andrea immediately dialed 911.348  While speaking “unemotionally”349 and
hesitating in response to questions, Andrea finally requested police and an am-
bulance.350 When the dispatcher asked Andrea if she was ill, she said that she
was. When he asked her if she was “sure” she was alone, Andrea responded that
her sister was with her when, in fact, she was alone.351 After Andrea called 911,
she called Rusty. “It’s time. I finally did it,” was her first statement to him.352
Then she told him to come home and hung up. Rusty called back, alarmed by
her tone of voice, and asked Andrea if anyone was hurt. “It’s the kids,” Andrea
said. He inquired which one.  She said, “All of them.”353
342. Roche, supra note 1, at 50.
343. See App. 3 at 92; see also Roche, supra note 1, at 50.
344. See App. 3 at 92; see also Roche, supra note 1, at 50.
345. See App. 3 at 93; see also Roche, supra note 1, at 50.
346. See App. 3 at 93; see also Roche, supra note 1, at 50.
347. See App. 3 at 93; see also Carol Christian, Deciding Fate Takes Heavy Toll, HOUS. CHRON., Mar.
10, 2002, at A1 (reporting the testimony of a pediatric pathologist who stated that four of Andrea
Yates’s children were still alive but unconscious when she took them from the bathtub and put them
in her bed).
348. Associated Press, Mother Faces Jury for Drowning Five Kids, Jan. 18, 2002, available at http://
www.courttv.com/trials/yates/021802_ap.html.
349. 911 Tape Reveals Unemotional Andrea Yates, CNN.COM, Jan. 6, 2002, available at http://www.
cnn.com/2001/US/12/10/yates.911.
350. See infra Appendix 2 at 85: Transcript of Andrea Yates's 911 Call (June 20, 2001) [hereinafter
App. 2].
351. See id.
352. Roche, supra note 1, at 44; 911 Tape Reveals Unemotional Andrea Yates, supra note 349.
353. Roche, supra note 1, at 44; 911 Tape Reveals Unemotional Andrea Yates, supra note 349. Dateline
NBC’s interview with Rusty Yates taped the following account:
Mr. R. YATES: She said, you know, like, “You need to come home.” I said, “Is anyone
hurt?” And she said, “Yes.” And I said–I said, “Who?” And she said, “The children.” And
I sa–and she said, “all of them,” and I–and I just–I mean, and my heart just sunk, you
know?
Bob McKeown & Dawn Fratangelo, The Stranger Within: Suzy Spencer Discusses Andrea Yates’ Life and
Postpartum Depression, Dateline NBC, Mar. 17, 2002 (NBC television broadcast, Mar. 17, 2002).
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The police officers who arrived described Andrea as “composed.” She
showed them where they could get clean glasses for a drink of water in the
kitchen, for example, and keys to unlock the back door.354
But it was Andrea’s seventeen-minute355 confession to Houston Police Sar-
gent Eric Mehl that was to have one of the biggest impacts on the jury. During
the jury’s brief forty minutes356 of deliberation, they had requested the audiotape
of Andrea’s account of what had transpired when she killed her children.357 To
the jurors, it appeared as though Andrea’s “plan” to kill her children was cold
and methodical.358 Nearly all of Andrea’s answers to questions were monosyl-
labic and the way that Mehl questioned her fostered the impression of matter-of-
fact indifference to the killing. “No,” she did not hate her children. “No,” she
was not mad at them. She had, however, considered the prospect of killing them
for two years.359 She realized that she was not being a good mother to them and
“they weren’t developing correctly,” either in their learning or their behavior.360
She also “realized that it was time to be punished” and, in response to Mehl’s
question, she wanted the criminal justice system to punish her.361 She added that
she had thought of drowning the children two months earlier362—and filled the
tub with water—but she “[j]ust didn’t do it at that time” and also believed that
Rusty would have stopped her.363
To those who did not “know” Andrea Yates, her attitude would, no doubt,
appear indifferent and her behavior calculated. But, as two postpartum special-
ists have noted with respect to the Yates case, organic psychosis involves a
“waxing and waning” of sensation and mood.364 Simply because Andrea called
her husband and the police after the killings does not necessarily mean she was
experiencing a “normal mental status” and could tell the difference between
right and wrong at the time of the killings.365 That kind of analysis suggests that
“we extrapolate backward then ‘predict’ that she had an intact thought proc-
ess.”366  Another expert honed the key issue: Crimes based on “deluded moral
reasoning” can be “well planned, carefully executed, and . . . have evidenced
high degrees of behavioral control.”367 As Part V discusses, Dietz’s perspective
on Andrea’s mental state was entirely different.
354. Jim Yardley, Texas Jury Convicts Mother Who Drowned Her Children, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2002,
at A23.
355. Roche, supra note 1, at 50.
356. See App. 1 (Mar. 16, 2002) at 74-75.
357. Roche, supra note 1, at 44; 911 Tape Reveals Unemotional Andrea Yates, supra note 349.
358. See Connell, supra note 129, at 18.
359. See App. 3 at 94.
360. See id. at 90.
361. See id. at 95.
362. See id.
363. See id.
364. Meyer & Spinelli, supra note 77, at 176.
365. Id. (“A call for help is not indicative of a normal mental status during an event.”).
366. Id.
367. Connell, supra note 129, at 19.
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V.  PARK DIETZ’S INTERVIEW AND TESTIMONY IN THE ANDREA YATES CASE
Park Dietz’s interview with Andrea Yates and his trial testimony provide
additional evidence for assessing how Dietz appeared to influence jurors. Part V
explores one particularly striking feature of Dietz’s testimony: Even though both
sides agreed that Andrea severely suffered from postpartum depression and
psychosis and that it significantly affected her conduct, neither side seriously
questioned Dietz’s statements or his knowledge.
A. Dietz’s Interview with Andrea
Dietz interviewed Andrea for two days in November 2001,368 nearly five
months after the killings and four months after Phillip Resnick, the defense’s
primary psychiatric expert, interviewed Andrea.369  Over the months after the
killings, Andrea showed substantial progress due to a regimen of antipsychotic
medication. Other professionals estimated that by August, Andrea’s psychosis
seemed under control370 and by September, a jury found her competent to stand
trial.371
According to Dietz, Andrea was grossly psychotic the day after the kill-
ings372 and was suffering from schizophrenia when he met her in November
2001.373 He still believed, however, that she knew the difference between right
and wrong at the time she killed her children.374 This conclusion, of course,
stemmed in part from the November interview he conducted with her and the
questions he asked about how and why she planned to kill her children.
In response to Dietz’s questions, Andrea explained that she did not want
her children “tormented by Satan” as she was.375 She noted that Satan had been
conveying “bad thoughts” through the television and the cameras in her
home.376 She was also “afraid Satan would lure [her] children to himself—and
maybe that [she] had some Satan in [her].”377 She believed Satan was “inside
[her] giving [her] directions . . . about harming the children . . . about a way
out—to drown them.”378 According to Andrea, the drowning would be “a way
out” because the children “would go up to heaven and be with God, be safe.”379
Basically, “at the time” Andrea thought “this was a good idea” because she
“didn’t want [her children] ruined—[she] was afraid they would continue to go
downhill—and [she] thought [she] should save them before that happened.”380
368. Dietz-Yates interview, supra note 154; see App. 4 at 100, tr. at 27.
369. Transcript of Phillip Resnick’s interview with Andrea Yates (July 14, 2001) [hereinafter Res-
nick-Yates interview] (on file with  author).
370. Meyer & Spinelli, supra note 77, at 174.
371. See App. 1 (Sept. 22, 2001) at 72.
372. See App. 4 at 114, tr. at 109.
373. See id. at 101, tr. at 51.
374. See id. at 137, tr. at 201.
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Andrea believed “the children were in torment” from Satan because they were
exhibiting relatively “more strife and disobedience”; however, she did not think
that Dora, her mother-in-law, was in such torment nor Rusty, who she believed
was a “good man.”381  In Andrea’s mind, Satan had selected her children because
of Andrea’s own personal “weaknesses”; in fact, she had stopped reading the
Bible close to the time of the killings because she “felt like Satan was nearby.”382
Andrea seemed to have been markedly influenced by the 1995 movie
“Seven,”383  a crime thriller about two homicide detectives who strive to solve a
series of mysterious murders patterned on the seven deadly sins: gluttony,
greed, sloth, pride, lust, envy, and wrath.384 Andrea told Dietz that because
“[she] felt [she] had done all the other sins” but murder, she believed that the
drowning would constitute her seventh, and last, sin.385 She claimed that she was
thinking of the movie on the day she killed her children—“about what [she] was
about to do, and how it fit in there—the deadly sins—and how [she had] done
all of them after [she] drowned the children.”386 She “saw [the drowning] as a sin
that [she was] going to commit.” Although the act of drowning would “con-
demn” her, it would save the children.387
While Andrea had ruminated about the seven deadly sins a week before
she killed her children, she picked the specific date she was going to drown
them only the night before.388 She did not tell Rusty her thoughts about the
deadly sins or of her plans to kill because, in response to Dietz’s question, she
believed Rusty would interfere.389 As Andrea explained, if she had been stopped,
“the children would still be alive” and she “would still worry about their soul
with Satan around.”390 On the morning of the killings, she tried to act as nor-
mally as possible so Rusty would not be alarmed.391
Despite Andrea’s claims of careful planning, however, on the day of the
killings, she did not close the blinds or the curtains or take the phone off the
hook (the door had already been locked the night before and Rusty left through
the garage exit).392 She also remembers taking her medication.393 In answer to
Dietz’s questions, she said she felt “the presence of Satan that morning . . . just
helping [her] fill up the tub, and getting ready.”394 Yet, she believed she would
be punished (“jail”) and she knew the act was illegal.395 It seemed as though An-
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. For a review of the story of the film, “Seven,” see Janet Maslin, A Sickening Catalogue of Sins,
Every One of Them Deadly, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1995, at C18.
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drea viewed the killing as a balancing test: “Doing it, [the children would] go to
heaven; not doing it, there’s the risk of Satan messing them up . . . . Probably if I
did it, I’d get in trouble.”396
Notably, in his court testimony, Dietz conceded that he did not interview
either Rusty or Dora, both of whom refused to see him.397  Dietz also stated that
Andrea had difficulty being viewed by others as mentally ill and that her atti-
tude hindered her recovery. For example, after her first suicide attempt, Andrea
refused to take the antipsychotic medication prescribed to her and flushed it
down the toilet.398 As Dietz emphasized, “the most consistent story she’s indi-
cated is that she didn’t think she was psychotic, didn’t want to be thought of
that way and resented someone calling her that.”399 However, a key issue that
was not brought out in Dietz’s testimony, either in direct or cross, is that An-
drea, like many psychotic people, was wrong about her mental status.400
B. Dietz’s Empirically Unsupported Conclusions
Dietz’s testimony about Andrea’s condition is full of troubling speculations
that sound authoritative but have no empirical support. Of course, the field of
psychiatry in general is vulnerable to such criticisms.401 As the following analysis
suggests, however, in a number of instances, Dietz’s accounts give Andrea’s ac-
tions a degree of intentionality and manipulation that seem to derive only from
Dietz’s interpretations and no other source.
396. Id.
397. See App. 4 at 100, tr. at 27.
398. See id. at 102, tr. at 57.
399. See id.
400. See Sonia Johnson & Martin Orrell, Insight and Psychosis: A Social Perspective, 25 PSYCHOL.
MED. 515, 515-20 (1995).
401. See Binder, supra note 40, at 1819-25 (noting in the context of expert witness testimony that
“[t]he field of medicine is not an exact science” and that “opinion is the result of reasoning, and no
one can be prosecuted for defective mental processes”) (citation omitted); Coles & Veiel, supra note
42, at 609-10 (contending that many health experts testifying in the areas of psychology and psy-
chiatry fail to meet the required standards for science and expert testimony by: “1. presenting idio-
syncratic theories; 2. making inappropriate conceptualisations; 3. quantifying data inappropriately;
and/or 4. selectively collecting, presenting, or interpreting data; and thereby 5. lacking the prime
requirement of an open, sceptical, mind”). For criticisms of psychoanalysis in particular, see Deborah
W. Denno, Crime and Consciousness: Science and Involuntary Acts, 87 MINN. L. REV. 269, 306-07 (2002)
(noting that, “over the last four decades, the status of psychoanalysis as a science has been seriously
undermined”); Eric R. Kandel, A New Intellectual Framework for Psychiatry, 155 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 457,
458 (1998) (discussing the specific “limitations of psychoanalysis as a system of rigorous, self-critical
thought”). One psychiatric expert’s characterization aptly addresses the sweeping nature of the pro-
fession’s flaws:
Although many of the psychopharmacological and technical developments in psychiatry
have been impressive, the conceptual foundation for the field continues to be primitive. As
a result, inconsistencies, contradictions, and confusion reign whenever certain fundamen-
tal issues arise. Psychiatry still has yet to come up with sound definitions of “mental ill-
ness,” “insanity,” “normality,” or “sanity.” And it still has yet to come up with a sensible
notion of personal responsibility, which lies at the heart of most legal issues.
Ludwig, supra note 42, at 116.
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1. Andrea’s Suicide Attempts
Dietz testified that when Andrea attempted suicide the first time using
pills, she got a “week away from the stressors, only with an overdose,” when she
was hospitalized (her admission to Methodist Hospital’s psychiatric unit).402 In
other words, the idea conveyed was that with “only” an overdose, Andrea could
get a substantial break from taking care of the kids and the house.  After her
week-long stay at Methodist, however, Andrea came back to the same stressful
environment in the cramped bus.403 For that reason, according to Dietz, the sec-
ond time Andrea attempted to commit suicide, she “upped the ante” by using a
knife.404 Presumably, by employing a more certain and serious instrument of
death, Andrea could acquire even more help and a bigger break than she got the
first time by “only” ingesting pills.  Dietz indicated that Andrea was successful
with this approach.405 While she was hospitalized the second time, her parents
insisted to Rusty that Andrea could no longer stay in the bus because it was not
healthy for her or the children.406 As a result, Rusty purchased a nice new house,
which was all ready for Andrea to live in when she returned from the hospital.407
In Dietz’s eyes, a new home was the reward that Andrea was seeking:  “[T]his
time, [the suicide attempt] not only got her hospitalized, it got her a house.”408
The implication, of course, is that Andrea somehow realized that she would
get both a long break and material benefit—“a house”—for her more dramatic
second suicide attempt. But, that view contradicts everything we know of An-
drea: that she hated to be hospitalized, that she continually resisted psychiatric
help, that she resented any kind of psychiatric label. Indeed, Andrea was so op-
posed to being re-hospitalized at Devereux Texas Treatment Center on March
31, 2001, that Saeed had to start the process of involuntarily committing her to a
state hospital.409 For Dietz to suggest, even indirectly, that Andrea’s suicide at-
tempts were strategic efforts to gain a better home derides the reality of An-
drea’s psychosis and the severity of her postpartum disorders. As the defense
noted, Andrea “never told any doctor that, ‘I wanted a new house.’”410 Andrea’s
marital history suggests just the reverse—that Andrea was enamored (perhaps
even more than Rusty) with the Woronieckis’ bus-living existence and later
apologized to Rusty for not being able to handle it.411
It is also questionable even by Dietz’s own account whether Andrea was in
fact “upping the ante”412 by using a knife rather than pills. Only moments before
making that statement, Dietz claimed that it was unclear what level of severity
Andrea’s knife-using episode entailed (“varying degrees of intent”); in contrast,
her ingestion of pills would most likely have resulted in her death if her mother
402. See App. 4 at 102 (emphasis added), tr. at 58.
403. See id. at 102-03, tr. at 58-59.
404. See id. at 102, tr. at 58.
405. See id. at 102-03, tr. at 58-59.
406. See App. 1 (Aug. 9, 1999) at 66.
407. See id.
408. See App. 4 at 102-03 (emphasis added), tr. at 59.
409. See App. 1 (Mar. 31, 2001) at 67-68.
410. See App. 4 at 135, tr. at 193.
411. See App. 1 (Dec. 14, 1999) at 67; see also Roche, supra note 1, at 47.
412. See App. 4 at 102, tr. at 58; see also Roche, supra note 1, at 48.
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had not awakened her.413 Most importantly, as Dietz conceded on cross-
examination, Andrea’s overdose and knife threat could be “interpreted by medi-
cal experts as an alternative to hurting her children.”414  Psychological research
suggests that “aggression against others and aggression against self frequently
co-occur” and that “[r]isk assessment for suicide and homicide should go hand
in hand.”415 Andrea’s psychiatric history and her final act of killing her children
support, rather than contradict, this suicide-homicide relationship.
2. Andrea’s Pregnancies
Dietz also portrayed Andrea as manipulative and controlling in her deci-
sion to discontinue medication and become pregnant again with Mary, her fifth
child.416 Initially, Dietz emphasized that Andrea did not want to admit her men-
tal illness and therefore did not take her medication for that reason;417 yet, he de-
picted her motives very differently when he discussed the medication issue in
the context of Andrea and Rusty’s apparent efforts to have another child. Ac-
cording to Dietz, Andrea’s pregnancy was “one of the repeated examples of
Mrs. Yates not following the advice of her doctor and thinking she knows best
and maintaining control.”418 Dietz suggests that Andrea directed the entire deci-
sion to conceive: “She’s the one deciding what to do. She will not take the medi-
cine unless she wants it. She will get pregnant when she wants to. She’s not
taking the medicine during pregnancy.”419
Dietz’s analysis assumes realities of Andrea’s life that did not exist. First, all
accounts of Andrea and Rusty’s marriage indicate that Rusty was the one in
control, the one making decisions, and the one pushing for more children.420 Sec-
ond, testimony revealed that both Andrea and Rusty had been advised by multi-
ple staff members “on the importance of staying on medications and on the im-
portance of not having another pregnancy.”421 Dietz’s conclusions suggest that
Rusty had nothing to do with the decision. Indeed, Rusty continually joked
(even at his children’s funeral) that he always wanted enough boys “to make up
a basketball team.”422 Likewise, Debbie Holmes testified that Andrea complained
to her about the continual pregnancies.423 Third, noncompliance with taking
medication is the norm among psychiatric patients for a variety of reasons, but
413. See App. 4 at 102, tr. at 58.
414. See id. at 135, tr. at 193.
415. Marc Hillbrand, Homicide-Suicide and Other Forms of Co-Occurring Aggression Against Self and
Against Others, 32 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 626, 632 (2001); see also Anna Lembke, A Psychosocial
Approach to Postpartum Depression, 19 PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, June 2002, available at http://www.
mhsource.com/pt/p020611.html (noting that in some cases of postpartum depression, a mother’s
belief that her child would be better off without her can result in maternal suicide while “[t]he not
uncommon corollary to that is a mother’s belief that her children are somehow defective or devel-
oping improperly, which can—in cases—lead to infanticide”).
416. See App. 4 at 104, tr. at 65.
417. See id. at 98, tr. at 4.
418. See id. at 104 (emphasis added), tr. at 65.
419. See id.
420. See supra notes 300-01 and accompanying text; see also Roche, supra note 1, at 48.
421. See App. 4 at 103-04, tr. at 64.
422. See App. 1 (Mar. 2000 n.93) at 78-79.
423. See supra note 301 and accompanying text; see also App. 1 (Feb. 28, 2002) at 73.
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often because the mentally ill are paranoid or delusional about what doctors
give them.424 By his comments, Dietz implied that Andrea’s behavior was
anomalous and that her refusal of medication related to her need to “control.”
Yet, recent research suggests that “more serious mental illness is a cause not a
consequence, of [a patient’s] refusal of treatment” with antipsychotic medica-
tion.425 In fact, when Andrea was being evaluated for her competency hearing,
she expressed concern that her medication may be contributing to her psychotic
episodes.  Resisting medication was also a matter of pride.426 Fourth, many
women reject medication while they are pregnant; the DSM entry on postpar-
tum disorders discusses this very issue and makes recommendations to medical
personnel about how to counteract it.427 Finally, Dietz never acknowledged that
more than fifty percent of all pregnancies are unplanned, irrespective of what
couples want or the decisions they make.428 Throughout his testimony about
Andrea’s last pregnancy, Dietz attributes a level of intentionality to events that
may well have simply been an accident.
3. Andrea’s Knowledge of Right and Wrong
In an interview with Time Magazine on the day that Andrea was sentenced,
Dietz stated that despite Andrea’s mental illness, her “thought process” still
424. Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas G. Gutheil, Drug Refusal: A Study of Psychiatric Inpatients, 137
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 340, 340 (1980) (noting that during a three-month study of patients at a commu-
nity mental health center, “refusal of medication was common” even though it did not severely af-
fect the care of most patients; when patient care was seriously impaired, however, the reasons for
patient refusal appeared to be “delusionally motivated”); see also Lorna R. Amarasingham, Social and
Cultural Perspectives of Medication Refusal, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 353, 358 (1980) (explaining that “[a]
substantial number of patients do not comply with prescribed regimens” and that the reasons for
patient refusal must take into account “the social and cultural meaning of medication” to the pa-
tient); Kathleen M. Carroll et al., Targeting Behavioral Therapies to Enhance Naltrexone Treatment of Opi-
oid Dependence: Efficacy of Contingency Management and Significant Other Involvement, 58 ARCH. GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 755, 761 (2001) (referring to the “significant problems with [drug therapy] compliance”
among psychiatric patients, particularly those who are most “compromised by compliance issues,
including the more highly impaired subgroups (. . . patients with dual diagnoses and those with per-
sonality disorders”)). One study concluded that patients who refused medication comprised three
“relatively distinct” categories:
1) situational refusers—a diverse group of patients who on occasion refused medication
for a short period of time and for one of a variety of reasons; 2) stereotypic refusers—
chronically ill patients with paranoid traits who habitually and predictably responded to a
variety of stresses with brief medication refusal; and 3) symptomatic refusers—young rela-
tively acutely ill patients whose refusal, often based on delusional premises, was sustained
over a long period and successfully stymied treatment efforts.
Appelbaum & Gutheil, supra, at 342.
425. John A. Kasper et al., Prospective Study of Patients’ Refusal of Antipsychotic Medication Under a
Physician Discretion Review Procedure, 154 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 483, 488 (1997) (emphasis added).
426. See App. 1 (Aug. 10, 1999, Jan. 2000) at 66-67; see also Jacqueline A. Sparks, Taking A Stand:
An Adolescent Girl’s Resistance to Medication, 28 J. MARITAL & FAM. THERAPY 27, 31 (2002) (noting that
for those patients “choosing to resist, the price may be worth it when it means the preservation of
choice, dignity, and a sense of personal agency”).
427. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 124, at 422-23.
428. Ortho Gives Packaging a New Twist, 23 CHAIN DRUG REV. 8 (June 4, 2001) (noting that,
“[a]ccording to the Association of Reproductive Health Professionals, more than 50% of all pregnan-
cies in the United States are unplanned each year”) (citation omitted).
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permitted her to know right from wrong.429 “Her mind recognized murder as
wrong or she would not have sought the death penalty to get rid of her inner
demons and protect her children from falling into [Satan’s] grasp.”430 Also, “by
wanting to dispose of Satan, she had to believe Satan had evil ideas. Therefore,
she still comprehended evil to be wrong. She also ‘knew that society and God
would condemn her actions.’”431 Of course, Dietz’s analysis of Andrea, both in
this interview and in court, presumes that Satan actually exists.
Frequently during his testimony, Dietz would strain the interpretation of
an incident to support the view that Andrea knew the difference between right
and wrong. For example, on May 3, when Andrea filled the home bathtub with
water while Dora Yates was present, the incident was perceived to be so bizarre,
it sent Andrea back to Devereux.432 According to Dietz, Andrea “doesn’t give a
reasonable account of why she did that [fill the tub], and they [Devereux] take
her back the next day or the day after.”433 But, in the months following the inci-
dent, Andrea gave several accounts of why she filled the tub that day, including
what seemed to be the most reasonable (and defense-oriented) one—she had
thoughts of drowning her children.434 A portion of the direct examination of
Dietz seemed to recognize that this explanation could support the defense’s po-
sition.435 If Andrea were contemplating drowning her children with Dora pres-
ent, it would fuel the defense’s argument that she may not have known that
what she was doing was wrong.  While this interpretation of Andrea’s motives
is purely speculative, it is the most rational account that Andrea herself pro-
vides. It is also congruent with the vague statement that Andrea made in re-
sponse to Dora’s question of why she was running the water, that is, “Just in
case I need it.”436
Indeed, at a later point in his testimony, Dietz downplayed the fact that
Andrea told others that she was considering drowning her children while Dora
was present. Dietz’s story is intertwined with Andrea’s own conflicting ac-
counts. As Dietz explained, “[s]ometimes she told doctors that she was thinking
of drowning the children then. Sometimes she said she thought she might
drown the children then. Sometimes she said that she might need it [the tub
water] because they might have their water cut off by the utility company; and
at those times, she said that she wasn’t thinking of drowning the children
then.”437 However, the explanation that Andrea gave Dietz while he was inter-
viewing her is the least reasonable one: “the utility company truck explanation
rather than drowning the children.”438
429. See Interview: Dr. Park Dietz, supra note 148.
430. See id.
431. See id.
432. See App. 1 (May 3, 2001) at 68.
433. See App. 4 at 104-05, tr. at 67.
434. See App. 1 (Feb. 21, 2002 n.180) at 82.
435. See App. 4 at 107, tr. at 78.
436. See App. 1 (May 3, 2001) at 68.
437. See App. 4 at 106, tr. at 75. There are also some accounts suggesting that Rusty was present,
but this is not entirely clear.
438. See id.
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The more pointed question to ask is, why did Andrea tell Dietz the com-
pany truck answer when she told others she was thinking of drowning her chil-
dren?  Does it really make sense for a woman to fill her family tub in such an
odd manner on May 3 because of a possible water shortage but then fill it again
on June 20 to drown her children? It seems unlikely that Andrea’s disruptive
actions on May 3, which were sufficiently disturbing to hospitalize her again,
appeared due to her concern over a water shortage, particularly in light of the
other evidence.
In sum, Dietz’s testimony was too focused on trying to explain Andrea’s
illogical thinking, which basically stemmed from her mental illness. His analysis
was not based on “facts” but rather pure speculation about her delusional
thought patterns. According to one legal scholar, “medical expert witnesses are
not advocates for either side in the litigation, but may advocate their opinion.”439
Yet, there were a number of aspects of Dietz’s testimony where his prosecutorial
bent came through quite obviously. For example, despite his level of experience,
Dietz repeatedly referred to the drownings as “homicides”440 or “crimes,”441 even
though at the time, Andrea had not been convicted of anything. Likewise, at
certain points, it was Dietz who directly led the prosecution to a criminal con-
clusion about Andrea. For example: “Q.  Now, you noted that - or Dr. Saeed told
Mr. Yates that someone must be with his wife, but she was left alone; was that
correct?  A. Yes. And, of course, the significance of that is that it gives her the
opportunity to commit the crimes.”442
C. Dietz’s Attempts to Give “Logic” to Andrea’s Illogical Delusions
A major portion of Dietz’s testimony was analyzing Andrea’s “homicide”
in three phases: (1) the pre-homicide phase, (2) the homicide phase, and (3) the
post-homicide phase. The pre-homicide phase was key for Andrea’s defense be-
cause it went to the issue of whether she knew the difference between right and
wrong. Dietz conceded that Andrea told both Rusty and her friend Debbie
Holmes about “her concerns for the presence of Satan, the influence of Satan.”443
Even in Dietz’s opinion, Andrea was open about her fears and did not attempt
to hide them.
What Dietz emphasizes, however, is that despite Andrea’s openness about
Satan, she concealed the thoughts of harming her children from other people. If,
for example, she was concerned that by mentioning the harm to other people it
would actually happen, Dietz responds that this fear would be even more rea-
son for Andrea to talk about it.444 Dietz’s “legal-like” logic applied to the think-
ing of a mentally ill Andrea Yates goes as follows:
If it’s true that she believed that killing the children would save them, then why
would she not want it to happen. She would want to talk about it so it came true
439. Ciccone, Expert Testimony, supra note 42, at 798.
440. See, e.g., App. 4 at 108, tr. at 83.
441. See, e.g., id. at 108, 110-11, tr. at 82, 92, 95.
442. See id. at 108, tr. at 81-82.
443. See id. at 109, tr. at 87.
444. See id., tr. at 88.
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and the children would be saved. So, I concluded at that point that she’s keeping
it secret, she knows that other people are going to stop her, that it’s wrong, that
it’s a bad idea; and she admits as such. She admits that she knows people will
stop her.445
Yet, there is no factual support for anything Dietz says. Dietz also rather
bizarrely analyzes Andrea’s statements as real and “debates” her theories about
Satan even though everyone agreed that Andrea was mentally ill and delu-
sional. Delusions are by definition illogical. As a key text on delusional disor-
ders emphasizes, “[i]n the delusional mode, thought form is relatively normal
but the abnormal content predominates and is associated with profound, but fo-
cused illogicality.”446 Dietz’s story is based on applying a logical analysis to An-
drea’s truly illogical ruminations. There is really no diagnostically acceptable
point to it.  Nor is it even clear that Andrea intended what Dietz said because
she never articulated it, he did.
Perhaps anticipating this criticism, Dietz explained that he is entitled to ap-
ply such an inordinate amount of logic to the thinking of a mentally ill person
because Andrea seemed to him to be “psychologically ready” to engage in the
act of killing.447 Yet again, Dietz does not provide any empirical support for this
very vague explanation. Parenthetically, the field of psychiatry does not encour-
age members of its profession to engage in logic-applied analyses of the illogical
ramblings of mentally ill people.
But, for Andrea, there was no escape from Dietz’s testimony; he seemed to
have cut off every avenue with some explanation based entirely on speculative
presumptions. Dietz showed striking confidence in his conclusions, despite the
conjecture. Comparably noteworthy was Dietz’s complete disregard of the lit-
erature on postpartum depression, which indicates that women generally do not
tell others that they are thinking about harming or killing their children; they are
afraid and embarrassed and disturbed by such thoughts.448 Dietz’s sweeping
generalizations about Andrea’s mental state are consistent with his ignorance of
the subject matter.
D. Dietz’s Criticism of Andrea’s Inability to Nurture Her Dead Children
Dietz also focused on the easiest emotional target of Andrea’s illogical-
ities—how Andrea treated her children after she killed them. For example, Dietz
queried why Andrea did not try to “comfort the children, telling them they are
going to be with Jesus or be with God.”449 Again, however, such comments were
guesswork on Dietz’s part. In other words, is it typical for mentally ill people to
give their children religious words of comfort before they kill them, particularly
if they think Satan is their guide?450
445. See id.
446. Alistair Munro, The Classification of Delusional Disorders, 18 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS OF N. AM.
199, 203 (1995) (emphasis added).
447. See App. 4 at 110, tr. at 89.
448. See Roche, supra note 1, at 47.
449. See App. 4 at 114, tr. at 106.
450. See supra notes 175-79 and accompanying text.
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While being cross-examined, Dietz acknowledged that Andrea had been
nurturing toward her dead children. She had placed her children’s heads on
pillows, for example, with Mary’s head “resting on her older brother’s shoul-
der” and Mary’s hand “cupped by her older brother’s hands.”451 According to
the police officers who arrived on the scene, the children’s bodies appeared
“posed,” as though the “older brother were taking care of the younger sister.”452
Such arrangements are perhaps a more objective gauge of Andrea’s thoughts
than the speculative hindsight Dietz offered. At the very least, the way that An-
drea situated her children suggested that she may have believed they were go-
ing to take care of one another; in contrast, Dietz had nothing to support his
comments apart from sheer conjecture.
Similarly, Dietz noted that Andrea seemed to cover each of her children’s
heads and faces as she put them on the bed.453 He suggested that she may have
covered them so that the remaining children, who were still alive, would not
discover the bodies.454 Later in his testimony, however, Dietz stated that An-
drea’s covering of her children’s faces was “an indication of her feeling guilt or
shame.”455 Dietz’s explanation for Andrea’s behavior is perplexing; there is a so-
cial norm to cover the faces of the deceased for reasons of respect or reverence. It
would have been just as reasonable for Dietz to have pitched Andrea’s motives
in an alternative way, in other words, to state that covering the children was
Andrea’s way of showing care and comfort to them, given that all of these ex-
planations are speculative anyway. Nonetheless, Dietz did resist supporting one
of the prosecution’s more damning insinuations—that Andrea’s decision to
leave Noah in the bathtub after he died was cold hearted. Instead, Dietz noted
that, at fifty pounds, Noah was too heavy for Yates to lift.456 “Nurses know not to
lift heavy weights.”457
Lastly, Dietz explained that Andrea seemed “grossly psychotic” and men-
tally disturbed from June 21 to some period thereafter, so “very sick” that she
was hearing “growls and voices” and seeing “teddy bears and ducks and
marching soldiers” that she believed were satanic.458 Yet, he claimed there was
not “nearly as much evidence of that kind of extreme sickness or gross psychosis
on June 20th as [there is] for the period beginning June 21st.”459 Dietz attributed
his impression that Andrea was “different in a sicker way” to the rapid changes
in Andrea’s life after she was arrested.460 However, there is an alternative expla-
nation. Andrea did not receive nearly as much medical attention on June 20 as
she did on June 21, when she became the object of intense evaluation. On June
20, she was with police for much of the day whereas on June 21, she was sur-
rounded by psychiatrists who were able to assess her mental state. Given these
451. See App. 4 at 131, tr. at 175.
452. See id.
453. See id. at 113-14, tr. at 105.
454. See id.
455. See id. at 116, tr. at 115.
456. See id. at 137-38, tr. at 202.
457. See id.
458. See id. at 114, tr. at 109.
459. See id. at 115, tr. at 110.
460. See id.
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day-to-day differences in the amount of time Andrea spent with medically
trained professionals, Dietz’s conclusions are unwarranted.
This analysis of Dietz’s testimony could extend even further, continually
assessing every word in the way that Dietz evaluated Andrea’s every move.
However, this Article is not intended to be an indictment of Dietz per se. Rather,
it is a commentary on how swayed and fragile insanity determinations can be in
the heat of litigation and how inadequate the criminal justice system is to handle
them. Dietz did not create this situation; he merely responds to the many who
want him to be part of it. As the following discussion makes clear, other aspects
of the Yates trial as well as the law and culture of Harris County also appeared
to be critical contributors to Andrea’s conviction.
VI.  OTHER VIEWPOINTS ON THE ANDREA YATES CASE
Up to this point, discussion of the Yates trial has focused on Park Dietz. Of
course, there were other perspectives and experts involved in the case.  Part VI
examines briefly only a selected number of these additional people and issues to
give a glimpse of a broader story about Andrea.
A. The Overall Defense and Prosecution Perspective
In general, the defense contended that Andrea’s mental illness led her to
believe she made the right choice when she killed her children. Andrea’s long
history of illness and her many visits to doctors461 created a situation in which a
number of defense experts were called to testify about her condition at the time
they treated her or her mental state at the time she killed her children.462 Yet, be-
cause of the numbers of medical specialists involved in the case who had evalu-
ated Andrea at different times and for different purposes, some offered seem-
ingly conflicting narratives of Andrea’s perception of right and wrong. This
range of opinion for the defense contrasted with the prosecution’s more consis-
tent argument that Andrea’s acts were sane and intentional because the prose-
cution primarily relied only on Dietz’s narrative.
Ironically, then, the severity and extent of Andrea’s mental illness may
have undercut her defense.  There was one story of sanity from the prosecution
and several stories of insanity from the defense.  For example, Dr. Melissa
Ferguson, a psychiatrist at the Harris County Jail, testified that Andrea told her
in a post-arrest interview that drowning her children was “the right thing to do”
461. See generally App. 1.
462. The following is a list of some of the major defense experts and the dates they testified: Dr.
Melissa Ferguson (psychiatrist at Harris County jail)—Feb. 22-23, 2002; Dr. George Ringholz (neuro-
psychologist from Baylor College of Medicine)—Feb. 26, 2002; Dr. Eileen Starbranch (psychiatrist
who treated Andrea for five months)—Feb. 26-27, 2002; Dr. Steve Rosenblatt (psychiatrist who ex-
amined Andrea after the drownings)—Mar. 1, 2002; Dr. Phillip Resnick (psychiatrist from Case
Western University)—Mar. 1, 2002; Dr. Ellen Allbritton (psychiatrist who admitted Andrea to De-
vereux)—Mar. 4, 2002; Dr. Debra Osterman (psychiatrist who saw Andrea after the drownings)—
Mar. 6, 2002; Dr. Lucy Puryear (psychiatrist)—Mar. 7, 2002; Dr. Mohammad Saeed (psychiatrist who
treated Andrea at Devereux)—Mar. 6, 2002.  See generally App. 1.
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since it saved them from a life of torment and eventual damnation in hell.463 De-
fense expert Dr. Phillip Resnick testified that although Andrea knew her actions
were illegal, “she did what she thought was right in the world she perceived
through her psychotic eyes at the time.”464 Describing Andrea’s motives as “al-
truistic,” Resnick explained that she believed that she was sending her children
to heaven and, in setting herself up for execution, ridding the world of Satan.465
Another expert witness for the defense, Dr. George Ringholz, explained that in
the midst of her “acute psychotic episode,” Andrea “did not know the actions
she took on that day were wrong.”466 Dr. Steve Rosenblatt further elaborated:
“She was out of contact with reality, did not know right from wrong, and in my
opinion, clearly was within what’s considered the legal definition of insanity.”467
Jurors struggling to make sense of it all would be additionally taxed by the
open disagreement between Resnick and another defense expert, Dr. Lucy
Puryear. According to Puryear, Andrea was too sick to know that her actions
were wrong. In contrast, Resnick stated that Andrea knew her acts were illegal,
but believed they were right because they saved her children from eternal dam-
nation.468 Granted, these two positions are not entirely mutually exclusive; how-
ever, Puryear acknowledged during cross-examination that there were conflicts
between her testimony and Resnick’s and stated merely that they had “differing
opinions.”469
Prosecutor Joseph Owmby claimed, on the other hand, that determining in-
sanity did not come down to “’a battle of the experts,’” but rather was “’a ques-
tion of common sense[.]’”470 According to Owmby, the experts simply “present
the evidence from the medical side” while the jurors, though unable to diagnose
mental illness, “can tell you whether they believe a person knew right from
wrong at the time.”471  Similar to Dietz’s testimony, the prosecution downplayed
Andrea’s history of mental illness as well as the neurobiological underpinnings
of her disorder.
463. See Yates’ Husband Set to Testify for Defense, CNN.COM, Feb. 27, 2002, available at http://www.
courttv.com/trials/yates/022702_cnn.html.
464. See Yates Claimed She Killed Kids to Keep Them from Going to Hell, supra note 26.
465. See Trial of Texas Mother Begins Third Week, supra note 20.
466. See Associated Press, Psychiatrist Says She Warned Yates, Feb. 27, 2002, available at
http://www. courttv.com/trials/Yates/022702-pm_ap.html.
467. See Trial of Texas Mother Begins Third Week, supra note 20.
468. See Associated Press, Videotapes Show Two Sides of Yates, Mar. 7, 2002, available at http://
www.courttv.com/trials/yates/030702-a_ap.html.
469. Id.
470. See Grinfeld, supra note 140.
471. Id.  According to some commentators, prosecutor Owmby’s image of experts framing a
picture that jurors fill in using common sense seemed flawed. The “huge chasm between our com-
mon-sense understanding of insanity and the legal definition of insanity,” Seligman, supra note 136,
seems to consider it inappropriate for jurors to judge Andrea’s actions using the same rationale that
they use to make daily decisions in their own lives. Even if jurors did understand that Andrea’s ver-
sion of right and wrong may be different from that of a non-mentally ill person, is it realistic to think
that a lay person would have the capacity to grasp the nature of Andrea’s mental illness, and its im-
pact on her ability to determine right from wrong? It seems more likely that, when confronted with
the conflicting complexities of determining Andrea’s  “knowledge” of the legal and moral concepts
of right and wrong, jurors’ confusion will make reliance on expert testimony all the more likely.
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Yet, most of the expert testimony offered in the Yates case did little to abate
the confusion surrounding Andrea’s mental state. Not surprisingly, the testi-
mony of expert witnesses for the prosecution directly clashed with the testimony
of expert witnesses for the defense. As one psychiatric journalist explained, al-
though prosecution expert Park Dietz and defense expert Phillip Resnick are
well known in their mutual fields, they nonetheless viewed Andrea’s insanity
defense “in polar opposite ways.”472
Overall, it appeared to be a tactical problem for the defense to deal with so
many psychiatric experts. Their contrasting analyses blunted the defense’s the-
ory.  Which story should the jurors choose? Assuming that Resnick was proba-
bly one of the stronger psychiatrists in terms of his demeanor and experience
and was therefore more equal to Dietz,473 the defense may have been better off
presenting just Resnick (in addition to the psychiatrists who actually treated
Andrea). With this approach, the defense would have had a clearer, more linear,
story that Andrea was indeed insane. As it so happened, Dietz probably ap-
peared better with his single theory in contrast to the defense’s multiple theories
concerning Andrea’s mental state.
The defense also would have benefited from questioning Dietz more ag-
gressively about the facts of Andrea’s history of postpartum depression and
psychosis.  Such a “detailing to death”474 tactic could have accomplished two
goals: (1) it would have accentuated Dietz’s lack of expertise in the area, and (2)
it would have stressed the neurological and biological aspects of the disorders.
The jury would perhaps more fully appreciate that insanity determinations are
based on far more than just “common sense” or speculation. The jurors’ own
comments indicate that this kind of psychiatric evidence had little to no impact
in their forty minutes of deliberation before deciding to convict Andrea.
B. The Jurors’ Comments
The jurors’ explanations for their verdict suggest that they were heavily
swayed by the prosecution’s presentation of the case. In their view, Andrea’s
manner of killing her children seemed “premeditated and methodical.”475 They
cited Andrea’s videotaped confession and the photographs of her children, alive
and dead, as “the most compelling evidence” of their unequivocal belief that
Andrea knew right from wrong.476 According to one juror, for example, because
472. See Grinfeld, supra note 140.
473. Dietz and Resnick have testified for the prosecution and the defense, respectively, in prior
trials, which resulted in the convictions of Jeffrey Dahmer and Unabomber Ted Kaczynski. Oliver
Burkeman, Family Murder Trial Splits Texas: The Killing of Five Children by Their Mentally Ill Mother
Highlights Controversial Death Penalty Laws in America,  GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 19, 2002, at 15.
474. For a discussion of the “detailing to death” tactic, see GREGORY M. MATOESIAN, LAW AND
THE LANGUAGE OF IDENTITY: DISCOURSE IN THE WILLIAM KENNEDY SMITH RAPE TRIAL, at v, 6, 69, 102
(2001).
475. See Associated Press, Yates Family Members Decry Husband, Mar. 18, 2002, available at http://
www.courttv.com/trials/yates/031802_ap.html.
476. See The Yates Trial Jury, HOUSTONCHRONICLE.COM, Mar. 16, 2002, at http://www.chron.
com/cs/CDA/story.hts/special/drownings/1233919; Yates Family Members Decry Husband, supra
note 475. The jury consisted of eight women and four men. At least five of the women were married
and held jobs, and four of those five had children. The three unmarried women were employed, and
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Andrea called the police immediately after the killings and could converse with
them and account for her behavior, “it seemed as if she was thinking pretty
clearly.”477 Another juror emphasized that Andrea “was able to describe what
she did . . . . I felt like she knew exactly what she was doing.”478 These “objective”
actions of Andrea’s are the kinds of factual evidence that Dietz stressed in his
determination that Andrea was sane.
The jurors also appeared to take seriously the prosecution’s depiction of
Andrea’s religiosity and her perception of her conduct as sinful. Indeed, religion
was an important force throughout the trial in a number of different ways.  For
example, prosecutor Owmby claimed to have prayed before deciding to seek the
death penalty for Andrea,479 and he expressed his firm belief that she was aware
that she had sinned.480 He also elicited testimony from one of the defense’s ex-
pert witnesses admitting that Andrea knew she had sinned.481 Surely, Andrea’s
own statements supported that view.482
On the surface at least, the jury seemed predisposed to embrace such re-
ligious characterizations.  In a television interview with four of the jurors con-
ducted shortly after the Yates verdict, the jurors’ comments indicated that they
all shared some Christian convictions.483 As the interviewer emphasized, “[i]n a
case [the Yates jurors]  found emotionally draining, they say prayer got them
through.”484 According to one juror, for example, all the jurors “held hands and
prayed . . . [the] Lord’s prayer, most mornings” and they “did the same thing be-
fore and after the verdict.”485 Another juror affirmed the prosecution’s sentiment
that Andrea “knew it was wrong in the eyes of God.”486 During the trial, there
appeared to be little left for the defense to hold on to other than evidence of An-
drea’s mental illness,487 and the nature and severity of her illness did not come
across adequately.
Dietz also accentuated sin and religion generally throughout his testimony,
far more than the “facts” of Andrea’s mental history.488 Of course, on the surface,
Andrea’s explanations for why she killed were laced with religion. Yet, given
the severity of her mental illness, the religious aspects of her delusions were
symptoms of her disorder, not a substantive issue for Dietz to “debate” with her.
two had children. All of the men were employed, at least three were married, and two had children.
Three women and two men had some exposure to psychology, either through counseling or an edu-
cational degree. See The Yates Trial Jury, supra.
477. See Yates Family Members Decry Husband, supra note 475.
478. Id.
479. See Cassel, supra note 84.
480. See Mother Faces Jury for Drowning Five Kids, supra note 348.
481. See Yates’ Mom: ‘She Was a Wonderful Mother,’ CNN.COM, Mar. 6, 2002, available at http://
www.courttv.com/trials/yates/030602_cnn.html.
482. See supra notes 463-65 and accompanying text.
483. See Dawn Fratangelo, The Jury Speaks: Jury Members Discuss Andrea Yates’ Trial, Dateline NBC




487. See Third Day of Testimony to Begin in Trial of Texas Mom, CNN.COM, Feb. 20, 2002, available at
http://www.courttv.com/trials/yates /022002_cnn.html.
488. See generally App. 4.
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Delusions and hallucinations about the devil are not uncommon among women
with postpartum psychosis and those who end up killing their children.489 In
turn, all mental illnesses are contextually based, reflecting the culture and day-
to-day circumstances of the mentally ill person.490 In other words, mental dis-
ability is interlinked with other influences in a person’s life, including the com-
munity where that person lives.
C. Religion and Culture
Given Andrea and Rusty’s intense interest in the Bible and the Woro-
nieckis’ lifestyle, it is understandable that such themes would provide the foun-
dation for Andrea’s delusional thoughts. While the Yateses were not affiliated
with any church,491 Rusty decided to hold the children’s funeral close to their
home at the Clear Lake Church of Christ,492 which Rusty now regularly at-
tends.493 Over a two-century history, Churches of Christ have divided into eight
primary branches,494 now totaling nearly two million members worldwide.495 The
majority mainstream wing of the Churches of Christ is especially strong in the
region of the United States spanning from Middle Tennessee to West Texas.496
The tenets of this mainstream branch give some perspective on Rusty’s current
religious views and what he may have believed in the past.
Consistent with Rusty’s prior distance from organized religion,497 Churches
of Christ purport to be nondenominational and therefore are not Catholic or
Protestant.498 Rather, followers of the Church simply call themselves “Chris-
tians.”499 Commonly, members contend “that they have restored the primitive
church of the apostolic age and are therefore nothing more or less than the true,
489. See supra note 232.
490. For a specific example of how culture shapes insanity, see ROBERT L. WINZELER, LATAH IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE ETHNOGRAPHY AND HISTORY OF A CULTURE-BOUND SYNDROME (1995).
491. See Roche, supra note 1, at 47.
492. See SPENCER, supra note 1, at 68-75.
493. Carlton Stowers, Tracks of His Tears, DALLAS OBSERVER, Jan. 23-29, 2003, at 30.
494. RICHARD T. HUGHES, REVIVING THE ANCIENT FAITH: THE STORY OF CHURCHES OF CHRIST IN
AMERICA 1 (1996) (noting that these branches of the Churches of Christ include the Pre-millennial
Churches of Christ, the Non-Class Churches of Christ, the One-Cup Churches of Christ, as well as
the International (Boston) Churches of Christ).
495. Edwin S. Gaustad, Churches of Christ in America, in 2 THE RELIGIOUS SITUATION: 1969, at 1013,
1017 (Donald R. Cutler ed., 1969); see also ChurchZip Coverage, at http://www.churchzip.com/
statisticalsummary.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2003). ChurchZip purports to provide “the world’s
largest and most accurate on-line directory of Churches of Christ” and cites a daily total of
membership in Churches of Christ. ChurchZip Coverage, supra. As of February 24, 2003, this
membership totaled 1,848,728 people worldwide. Id.
496. HUGHES, supra note 494, at 1; see also ChurchZip Coverage, at http://www.churchzip.com/
uscastatisticalsummary/US (last visited Feb. 24, 2003) (indicating that Tennessee and Texas still have
the highest concentrations of Church of Christ members in the United States as of Feb. 24, 2003).
497. See supra notes 57-58, 291 and accompanying text.
498. Gaustad, supra note 495, at 1013-14. But see HUGHES, supra note 494, at 2 (noting that al-
though the “Churches of Christ have passionately rejected the labels sect and denomination as perti-
nent to their own identity . . . their denial of these categories flies in the face of social reality, [hence]
their story is one of deep irony and absorbing interest”).
499. Gaustad, supra note 495, at 1013.
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original church described in the New Testament.”500 Indeed, Churches of Christ
have essentially “denied that they had a defining history other than the Bible it-
self” and many members have no knowledge of the Church’s original found-
ers.501 “Biblical authority,” therefore, is paramount502 and Church members defy
“hierarchy or headquarters or national program.”503 As a result, each congrega-
tion is an independent body504 and “practices vary widely” among them.505
The Clear Lake Church of Christ has an extensive website,506 which offers a
range of lessons.507 The Church also sponsors the White Stone Ministry, whose
mission is in part to aid “those who do not know Christ” by introducing them to
Jesus and the Bible’s scriptures.508 In addition to posting specific scriptures, the
White Stone Ministry offers a number of instructive articles, which appear to fo-
cus on “sexual sin”509 and the hazards of pornography, particularly in compari-
son to a good marriage.510
500. HUGHES, supra note 494, at 2. According to Richard Hughes, “arguably the most widely dis-
tributed tract ever published by Churches of Christ or anyone associated with that tradition” was
entitled, “Neither Catholic, Protestant, Nor Jew.” Id. at 4. Published during the 1960s, the tract as-
serted the following:
[T]he church of Christ is neither Catholic, Protestant, nor Jewish. We are unique and dif-
ferent for we are endeavoring to go all the way back to the original New Testament
church. Using the New Testament as our blueprint we have re-established in the twentieth
century Christ’s church. It fits No modern label. It is not just another denomination.
Id. (citation omitted).
501. Id.
502. Edwin S. Gaustad, Churches of Christ, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHRISTIANITY 573 (Erwin Fahl-
busch et al. eds., 1999). According to one author’s account of the Church of Christ, most members
believe that the original manuscripts that now constitute the Bible “were divinely inspired, by which
it means they are infallible and authoritative.” What Is the Church of Christ?, 1 BIBLICAL STUD. J. (Apr.
1, 1997), at http://www.biblicalstudies.org/v001n03.html.
503. Gaustad, supra note 502, at 573; see also What Is the Church of Christ?, supra note 502 (noting
“that by the very nature of the organization of the church of Christ, it is not possible for this author,
or anyone else, to speak officially for the churches of Christ throughout the world” although the
author asserts that his “comments [describing the Church] express the basic beliefs and convictions
of most members of the churches of Christ”).
504. Jack Harriman, What’s Different About the Church of Christ?, West-Ark Church of Christ On-
line Library, at http://www.westarkchurchofchrist.org/library/topic1.htm (last visited Feb. 24,
2003).
505. See ChurchZip Coverage, supra note 495.
506. Clear Lake Church of Christ, at http://www.clearlakechurch.com (last visited Mar. 25,
2003).
507. Clear Lake Church of Christ, The Truth Will Set You Free, at http://www.clearlakechurch.
com (last visited Mar. 25, 2003). The lessons provided through the Clear Lake Church of Christ web-
site cover a wide range, although a prevalent message is the notion that humans cannot “make it”
without God. Id. According to the Church’s minister, Byron Fike, for example, human beings cannot
“make it” without God and must be “dependent or broken” because “[b]eing broken is the first step
of coming to know God.” Id. (Lesson 4—Dependence Upon God).
508. Clear Lake Church of Christ, White Stone Ministries Mission Statement, at http://www.
clearlakechurch.com (last visited Mar. 25, 2003).
509. David K. Foster, Sexual Sin & Bondage: What Does it Look Like to Be Healed? Part I, White Stone
Ministries, at http://www.clearlakechurch.com (last visited Mar. 25, 2003).
510. David E. Longacre, Marriage and the Power of Porn, White Stone Ministries, at http://www.
clearlakechurch.com (last visited Mar. 25, 2003).
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The importance of religion in the south and Harris County in particular
should not be downplayed when analyzing the reasons for Andrea’s conviction,
especially since religious themes were highlighted by the prosecution. Accord-
ing to one legal scholar’s analysis of the literature on “[t]he southern subculture
of punitiveness,”511 a key “facet of American Southern exceptionalism is the
South’s distinctive embrace of Protestant fundamentalism,” which is why the
South is commonly referred to as “the Bible belt.”512
In turn, a substantial body of research shows a link between Southern fun-
damentalism and support of the death penalty.513 While the precise explanation
for this association is not clear, it is “real” nonetheless and exists along with
other evidence of the South’s disproportionate proclivity to violence.514
With respect to the Yates case specifically, it seems that the prosecution and
Dietz were in religious sync with the jury, presuming the jurors were in any way
representative of Harris County, the heart of the Bible belt.515 While the role of
the jury is to reflect community values, Dietz’s “Bible thumping” may have
merely reinforced what could have been the jury’s own initial, moral, thesis
about Andrea’s mental state. The defense should have detailed Dietz to death to
separate the religion from the “real” facts of the case. As it stands, religion ap-
peared to dominate much of the testimony, and the medical aspects of postpar-
tum psychosis and Andrea’s history of mental illness took a substantially
smaller role.
D. Andrea Yates’s Competency
One of the most significant problems that the defense confronted was An-
drea’s resistance to assisting in her own case. From the moment she completed
the killings, Andrea seemed intent upon seeking punishment for her actions.516
This kind of thinking may have been a symptom of her particular mental ill-
ness—her suicidal and homicidal ideas—and it is not unusual.517
In an interview with the police who responded to her call immediately after
the killings, for example, the only question Andrea asked was when she would
be tried.518 The next day, she told her prison psychiatrist, Melissa Ferguson, that
she was guilty and deserved punishment.519 Dr. Gerald Harris, the clinical psy-
chologist who testified for the defense at Andrea’s competency hearing, recalled
that when he first spoke to Andrea shortly after the killings, she made troubling
comments regarding Satan.520 In arguing that Andrea was not yet competent to
511. Marian J. Borg, The Southern Subculture of Punitiveness? Regional Variation in Support for Capi-
tal Punishment, 34 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 25, 25 (1997).
512. Steiker, supra note 9, at 124.
513. Id.; Professor to Discuss Death Penalty, supra note 180.
514. Steiker, supra note 9, at 124.
515. See supra notes  8-9, 511-12 and accompanying text
516. See supra notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
517. Telephone interview with Shari Lusskin, M.D., supra note 279.
518. Associated Press, Psychiatrist Testifies in Yates Trial, Feb. 22, 2002, available at http://www.
courttv.com/trials/yates/022202-defense_ap.html.
519. See Yates’ Fate Hinges on Doctors’ Words, supra note 7.
520. See Associated Press, Mother Accused in Deaths of Five Children Not Yet Mentally Stable to Stand
Trial, Sept. 19, 2001, available at http://www.courttv.com/news/2001/0919/yates_ap.html.
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stand trial, Harris emphasized that people are not going to adequately defend
themselves if they believe that their death will eliminate Satan.521
In his competency report, Harris also noted that even though Andrea was
experiencing both auditory and visual hallucinations,522 she claimed that she was
“fine and has no mental problems.”523 In turn, Andrea “admit[ted] only that she
was depressed in the past and had some irrational thoughts”; yet, she “ap-
pear[ed] to believe” that her medication “helped the depression” but may also
“have caused the psychotic symptoms.”524 Likewise, Andrea “repeatedly ex-
press[ed] an aversion to taking any medication because of her ‘pride.’”525  Harris
found Andrea incompetent to stand trial, given that “[h]er denial of mental ill-
ness and reluctance to provide information about it prevents access to informa-
tion that could be important to her defense.”526 He further observed that “she is
easily confused and manipulated and has a diminished emotional capacity,
likely preventing her from presenting herself appropriately in court.”527
Dr. Steven Rubenzer, the state’s forensic psychologist, found Andrea com-
petent to stand trial despite the fact that she denied her mental illness and
521. See id.
522. See Harris, supra note 25.  What is also clear from Harris’s competency report is Andrea’s
improvement during the three periods in which he examined her. When he first met with her on
June 25, 2001, for example, she was on suicide watch and had started treatment for antipsychotic
medication. As Harris noted:
At that time she was exhibiting overt signs of psychosis and depression.  She appeared to
meet most of the criteria for catatonia. Motor movement was slow, her affect was flat,
there was very little eye contact, she had poor short and long term memory, and her re-
sponse time to questions was up to two minutes or more.  She also expressed delusional
thinking, such as talking directly to Satan, being involved in an elaborate plan to destroy
Satan, and seeing satanic symbols in the walls.  Her insight and judgment were extremely
poor.  She stated at this time that her thinking was clear.
Id. When Harris met with Andrea for the second time on June 29, 2001, her condition had not really
improved.  Despite continuing on Haldol and Zoloft, she again exhibited clear symptoms of psycho-
sis and depression.  Poor memory and responsiveness, flat affect and delusional thinking were pres-
ent.  By August 31, 2001, Andrea had “appeared, on the surface, to have significantly improved
functioning,” although she still had definite problems:
She was oriented to time and place and interacted more appropriately.  Affect was blunted
but not flat, made some eye contact, and response delay was decreased.  However, she still
had staring spells, frequently needed questions or instructions repeated, and exhibited
poor insight and judgment.  Her memory also continues to be impaired and abstract
thinking or reasoning is poor.
Despite denial of any hallucinations or delusions, she clearly continues to have some de-
gree of belief in her grandiose and paranoid ideation. When talking about such things as
cameras watching her every move as a mother, or messages being sent to her through the
television, she easily slips into language describing them as credible or true and becomes
emotionally agitated. Asked if there were video cameras monitoring her in the past, she
stares off and slowly replies, “maybe.”
Id.
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downplayed her depression.528 When Rubenzer asked Andrea about her use of
the insanity defense, Andrea “stated she does not believe she is mentally ill and
should be punished for her actions.”529 This response supported her attorneys’
claim that “she has consistently expressed the desire to plead guilty” and “has
expressed reluctance to use an insanity plea.”530  In addition, Rubenzer reported
that Andrea evidenced feelings of “depression, social isolation, suspiciousness
of other people” as well as a “feeling that her thoughts are blocked, or taken
away, or can be heard by other people.”531 Andrea also stated that “she has heard
voices that others cannot hear in the past.”532 However, while Rubenzer ac-
knowledged that Andrea’s desire for punishment could hinder her ability to as-
sist in her own defense,533 this factor did not preclude his determination that she
was competent to stand trial.
The transient nature of Andrea’s postpartum psychosis contributed to the
defense’s hurdles because she was being treated and her mental state therefore
improved.  Ferguson observed that Andrea continued to show signs of psycho-
sis for a full month after the drownings, but by early August the psychosis had
lifted.534  Legally, the fact that Andrea no longer suffered from psychosis at the
time of trial should not have posed a problem.  The Texas insanity statute clearly
states that defendants need only have lacked knowledge as to the wrongfulness
of their actions “at the time of the conduct charged.”535  Nonetheless, jurors may
have been skeptical of a mental illness that allegedly existed during the commis-
sion of the crime, but seemed to have disappeared by the time of trial.536
The defense introduced psychiatric testimony and a vast array of medical
records to establish Andrea’s history of mental illness and post-arrest psycho-
sis.537 But the only person who could genuinely testify to Andrea’s state of mind
at the essential moment, the moment of the killings, was Andrea herself.538  In an
interview with Rubenzer, Andrea claimed that she thought her actions were
528. See Steven J. Rubenzer, Competency Evaluation, Aug. 5, 2001 (for Andrea Pia Yates, case
#88025) (on file with author).
529. As Dr. Rubenzer reports, on August 2, 2001, Andrea Yates “stated she does not believe that
she is mentally ill, a position she has also reported to her past treating psychiatrist, Dr. Ferguson.” Id.
at 3.  Andrea also “minimized the degree of her depression, which those around her have often de-
scribed as severe.” Id.
530. Id. at 5.
531. Id. at 3-4.
532. Id. at 4.
533. Id. at 6 (“She has stated she wants to be punished and could fail to assist her attorney de-
velop her defense because of this desire.”).
534. See Associated Press, Doctor: Yates Was in Psychotic Fog, Mar. 6, 2002, available at http://
www.courttv.com/trials/yates/030602_ap.html.
535. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01 (Vernon 2002).
536. See Liu, supra note 1, at 362 (noting that the “ephemeral nature” of postpartum psychosis “is
particularly problematic in that it contradicts the stereotypical notion of a severe mental illness as a
debilitating disorder that affects the defendant both during the commission of the act and at the time
of trial, although this illness may be abated presently with the aid of medication”).
537. See generally App. 1.
538. See Texas Mom Drowns Kids, COURTTV.COM, Feb. 28, 2002, available at http://www.courttv.
com/talk/chat_transcripts/2002/0227yates-deltito.html (quoting Dr. Joseph Deltito, professor of
psychiatry at New York Medical College: “There is no way to prove [that someone is experiencing a
psychotic episode right at the time] other than observation and report on the part of the person.”).
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right during the time she drowned her children, and only “realized they were
legally wrong after the fact when she called the police.”539 Given that Andrea’s
knowledge of right and wrong was at the crux of her entire case, it would have
been helpful if Andrea had elaborated upon this statement for the jury’s benefit.
Rubenzer testified that as Andrea’s mental health improved, she would become
better able to appreciate her actions;540 one can only wonder whether part of An-
drea’s reluctance to assist in her own defense was due to her growing guilt and
horror at the enormity of what she had done.
E. Final Comments
The Yates case concerned a multitude of legal and social issues; this Article
focused on just a few.  There is no in-depth discussion, for example, of potential
solutions for the problems that the case revealed although, of course, improve-
ments are clearly needed. While it is beyond the bounds of this Article to con-
sider this topic in any more detail, a few points merit brief mention.
A critical point pertains to the narrow nature of the Texas insanity stan-
dard. According to Dietz, Andrea most likely would not have been convicted if
the insanity standard had been more lenient,541 such as the ALI test.542 Indeed, in
a postpartum depression case that followed Andrea’s conviction, Dietz success-
fully testified as an expert for the defense in an ALI test state (Illinois).543 The
mother, a pediatrician who killed one of her sons with a knife and severely as-
saulted the other son, was found not guilty by reason of insanity based largely,
it seems, on Dietz’s testimony.544
Most states, like Texas, follow a M’Naghten-type standard, not an ALI test.545
Dietz has suggested that one possible solution to any injustice that the Yates case
may have created is to adopt the approach applied in Great Britain.546 Under the
British Infanticide Act of 1922547 which was amended in 1938,548 a mother who
539. See The Andrea Yates Case, COURTTV.COM, Mar. 15, 2002, available at http://www.courttv.
com/talk/chat_transcripts/2002/0315yates-crier.html.
540. See Mother Accused in Deaths of Five Children Not Yet Mentally Stable to Stand Trial,  supra note
520.
541. See Toufexis, supra note 150.
542. See MODEL PENAL CODE 1985 § 4.01(1), supra note 97, at 163.
543. Karen Mellen & Bonnie Miller Rubin, Mom Found Insane, Not Guilty in Her Son’s Killing, CHI.
TRIB., Dec. 4, 2002, at 1.
544. Id.
545. See Farabee & Spearly, supra note 130, at 673.
546. See Toufexis, supra note 150.
547. INFANTICIDE ACT of 1922, Ch. 18, repealed (Eng). For a history of the development of the
British Infanticide Act, see Karen Lewicki, Can You Forgive Her? Legal Ambivalence Toward Infanticide,
8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 683 (1999).
548. INFANTICIDE ACT of 1938, c. 36, § 1 (Eng.). The Act reads as follows:
§ 1 Offence of infanticide.
 (1) Where a woman by any wilful act or omission causes the death of her child being a
child under the age of twelve months, but at the time of the act or omission the balance of
her mind was disturbed by reason of her not having fully recovered from the effect of
giving birth to the child or by reason of the effect of lactation consequent upon the birth of
the child, then, notwithstanding that the circumstances were such that but for this Act the
offence would have amounted to murder, she shall be guilty of felony, to wit of infanti-
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evidences a postpartum disorder and kills her infant during the first year of its
life can only be convicted of manslaughter, and not murder. Postpartum disor-
ders are recognized as a form of diminished capacity that reduces murder to
manslaughter, thereby providing a trial court some range in determining sen-
tencing (anywhere from life imprisonment to a psychiatric sentence).549  Of
course, Great Britain does not have the death penalty,550 which was a key ele-
ment in the Yates case irrespective of the insanity defense.551
Other kinds of reforms have also been suggested for incorporating post-
partum disorders as evidence for a defense or mitigation.552 Yet, the British In-
fanticide Act is an established illustration of how infanticide can be treated as a
separate category of crime when there are medical problems associated with the
killing. As it stands, American law has neither a separate criminal  category nor
cide, and may for such offence be dealt with and punished as if she had been guilty of the
offence of manslaughter of the child.
 (2) Where upon the trial of a woman for the murder of her child, being a child under the
age of twelve months, the jury are of opinion that she by any wilful act or omission caused
its death, but that at the time of the act or omission the balance of her mind was disturbed
by reason of her not having fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to the child or
by reason of the effect of lactation consequent upon the birth of the child, then the jury
may, notwithstanding that the circumstances were such that but for the provisions of this
Act they might have returned a verdict of murder, return in lieu thereof a verdict of infan-
ticide.
 (3) Nothing in this Act shall affect the power of the jury upon an indictment for the mur-
der of a child to return a verdict of manslaughter, or a verdict of guilty but insane[.]
Id.
549. Id.; see also Velma Dobson & Bruce Sales, The Science of Infanticide and Mental Illness, 6
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 1098, 1101 (2000) (reviewing the range of legal outcomes available under
the British Infanticide Act of 1938). Presently, none of the states has a statute similar to the British
Infanticide Act. Macfarlane, supra note 232, at 138. The differences between the ways the United
States and Great Britain treat mothers who commit infanticide and then claim a defense of postpar-
tum depression were strikingly illustrated by the case of Caroline Beale. See Mark Jackson, Infanti-
cide: Historical Perspectives, 146 NEW L.J. 416, 416 (Mar. 22, 1996) (stating that “one of the most contro-
versial aspects of the case of Caroline Beale has been the explicit comparison between English and
American law”). Beale was English but killed her newborn daughter in New York on September 21,
1994. The terms of Beale’s plea bargain mandated that Beale plead guilty to manslaughter and re-
ceive a sentence of eight months imprisonment (which amounted to time served), five years’ proba-
tion, and at least one year of psychiatric treatment. Beale’s trial drew international attention to post-
partum depression as a legal issue since the outcome of her case was so much harsher under
American rather than British law. See generally DUNCAN CAMPBELL, A STRANGER AND AFRAID: THE
STORY OF CAROLINE BEALE (1997). Accordingly, the British press emphasized that Andrea Yates
would have received a substantially more lenient outcome in England than in the United States.
Gumbel, supra note 77, at 1 (“In Britain, by contrast, the chances are that Yates would have been ac-
quitted on the grounds of temporary insanity—if she had been brought to trial at all.”). But see Dob-
son & Sales, supra, at 1100 (contending “that the proper criminal legal response to infanticide lies
somewhere between the inappropriately broad British approach and the myopic American position
that effectively ignores the subclass of women who deserve closer scrutiny for the relation of their
serious mental illness to the criminal defenses of insanity and diminished capacity”).
550. Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965, c. 71, Enactment Clause 1 (Eng.); Human
Rights Act 1998, c. 42, sched. 1, pt. III (Eng.) (“A State may make provision in its law for the death
penalty in respect of acts committed in time of war or of imminent threat of war.”).
551. See supra note 12.
552. Liu, supra note 1, at 388-98.
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any legislative recognition of postpartum psychosis as a mitigating factor, al-
though the disorder can be used as a defense in criminal cases.553
Notably, one key issue potentially on appeal in the Yates case could have
had a major impact on the outcome apart from any kind of new reform proposal
involving postpartum disorders.  Under Texas law, Andrea’s attorneys were un-
able to explain to the jury the consequences of Andrea being found “not guilty
by reason of insanity.”554  The state has a provision requiring that a defendant
not be automatically released from the trial court’s jurisdiction when acquitted
under the insanity defense.555  In fact, the trial court has the “continuing jurisdic-
tion to impose involuntary commitment for a defendant acquitted by reason of
insanity” as well as “maintain jurisdiction to involuntarily commit an acquitted
defendant to the state mental hospital for the rest of the defendant’s natural
life.”556 Because of the stringent nature of the court’s control over a defendant
determined to be insane, it is conceivable that the Yates jury would have been
influenced by knowing that Andrea could not possibly have “walked free” if
they had accepted her insanity plea.557 It also seems likely that Dietz’s expert tes-
timony would not have had the same effect if Texas did not have such a harsh
insanity provision.
Debates abound on how psychiatric experts like Dietz should be treated in
cases involving insanity determinations. Historically, the criminal justice system
encouraged experts to become involved in insanity cases because it was believed
that doctors and lawyers working together would produce a higher form of jus-
tice for defendants.558 By the mid 1800’s, however, conflict between the two pro-
fessions was rampant and the strategy of using experts was both expensive and
commonly unproductive.559 As this Article’s analysis of Dietz’s testimony indi-
cates, these problems remain today. Some legal scholars have recommended that
judges appoint experts approved by both sides to avoid the potential biases that
553. See Denno, supra note 43, at 138-42; Michelle Oberman, Mothers Who Kill: Coming to Terms
with Modern American Infanticide, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 1-109 (1996).
554. TEXAS CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 46.03 § 1(e) (Vernon 2002).
555. WHATLEY, supra note 84, at 5 (comparing the Texas death penalty standard to other state
standards); see also State v. Yates, Motion to Declare Article 46.03, Section 1(e) of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure Unconstitutional (Dist. Ct., Harris County, Tex.) (Oct. 30, 2001) (declaring article
46.03, section 1(e) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure unconstitutional because “[t]he Statute
precludes a juror in a case in which the insanity defense is raised from knowing that the trial court
continues to maintain jurisdiction over the defendant after a finding of not guilty by reason of in-
sanity”).
556. TEXAS CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 46.03 (Vernon 2002).
557. In a Dateline NBC interview with four of the jurors, one juror said “it wouldn’t have
changed [her] opinion at all” to have known that Andrea would not have been set free after an ac-
quittal because the juror “assumed she would go to an institution all along” in such a circumstance.
Fratangelo, supra note 483.  Another juror claimed that he thought “there needs to be a punishment
for this crime” and he was “not sure” if institutionalization in a mental health facility “would have
been punishment enough” in his opinion. Id. However, these comments reflect the views of only two
of the jurors and the second juror was ambivalent about how he would have responded.  Id. Of
course, it is also difficult to assess how jurors would really have been affected because their opinions
reflect hindsight after they have just convicted someone for life imprisonment.
558. See generally  MOHR, supra note 41, at 3-139.
559. Id. at 140-224.
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arise because of the experts’ partisanship.560  Those skeptical of the contention
that any expert can be unbiased, however, have other suggestions.  For example,
the criminal justice system could (1) require that the experts be hired by one
party but have their role limited or (2) mandate that the experts serve only as a
consultant to an attorney.561 While other kinds of reforms have been suggested,562
the law remains quite static in terms of any changes, despite the obvious diffi-
culties.
The issue of bias among experts perhaps becomes especially provocative in
cases involving gender specific criminal defenses563 as well as gender differences
in the context of the death penalty.564 As legal commentators have insightfully
noted, the Yates case evokes sensitive subjects that arise when mothers are
charged for killing their children.565  Dietz’s testimony specifically targeted An-
drea’s role as “mother” both before and after she killed her children;566 it is no
leap to suggest this issue was significant in her conviction.
This overview provides some inkling of the broad range of factors bearing
on the Andrea Yates case. For this reason alone, it appears that the case is one of
the most significant and complex insanity stories in the past few decades.
CONCLUSION
This Article examined the different stories behind the Andrea Yates death
penalty case—the defense’s, the prosecution’s, and the explanation that Andrea
herself provided. The jury did not accept the defense’s story that Andrea was
insane and thought she was under Satan’s influence at the time she drowned her
five children in the bathtub. Rather, the jury convicted Andrea and sentenced
her to life in prison based on the prosecution’s story that Andrea was sane and
acting intentionally when she killed her children, even though she was mentally
ill. Andrea herself fueled the prosecution’s account and, of course, to her detri-
ment. She felt that she had sinned and that she deserved to die.
The most persuasive storyteller of them all, however, was Park Dietz, the
prosecution’s star expert witness. His singular, consistent narrative of Andrea’s
sanity contrasted sharply with the multiple, inconsistent portrayals provided by
defense experts. Ironically, the severity of Andrea’s mental illness appeared in
some sense to be a negative force in her case.  It constituted the underpinnings
of her wish to be punished (even executed) and it also produced the numbers of
doctors who became involved in her life and, consequently, her trial. All of these
factors contributed to a psychiatrically muddled snapshot of who Andrea was.
560. Ciccone, Expert Testimony, supra note 42, at 796.
561. Id.; see also Ciccone, Murder, supra note 42, at 608.
562. See generally Perrin, supra note 40 (providing an overview of the role of expert witnesses in
the criminal justice system and suggesting reforms).
563. Denno, supra note 43, at 138-42.
564. For an excellent overview of gender differences in the application of the death penalty, see
Elizabeth Rapaport, Equality of the Damned: The Execution of Women on the Cusp of the 21st Century, 26
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 581 (2000); Victor Streib, Gendering the Death Penalty: Countering Sex Bias in a Mas-
culine Sanctuary, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 433 (2002); see also Howarth, supra note 1, at 218-19 (noting the sig-
nificance of gender in comparing the Karla Faye Tucker case with the Andrea Yates case).
565. See Albiston et al., supra note 1, at 14-15; Bangs, supra note 1, at 93-108.
566. See generally App. 4.
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There were other apparently key influences in Andrea’s case—the punitive
nature of Harris County and Andrea’s death qualified jury, for example, as well
as the atypically strict and ambiguous structure of the Texas insanity standard.
The power of Dietz’s testimony, however, was the primary focus of the discus-
sion. Despite his reputation for emphasizing “facts” and his ability to offer a
much simpler landscape of Andrea’s mental state, Dietz’s level of speculation
was troubling. There was little, if any, empirical basis for his conclusions, and
his sweeping conjecture spotlighted his lack of expertise in postpartum depres-
sion and postpartum psychosis.
Dietz’s version of “Who is Andrea Yates?” was convincing to the jury, al-
though it is difficult to discern how much reality was behind it. At the same
time, legal scholars and policy makers have yet to offer substantial improve-
ments on the way expert testimony is treated in court. The Park Dietzes of the
expert testimony world are not simply invited to be part of the criminal justice
system, they are avidly embraced. It is not up to them to change a system in
which they are providing what is viewed to be a necessary service.  They
should, however, comport with the ethical requirements of their profession.
And legal procedures should also control what kinds of stories can be told.
This Article’s analysis of the Andrea Yates case makes no claim to have the
“right” story about Andrea, whatever that may be.  Based on the limited amount
of information yet available on the case, it had other goals. For example, an ex-
amination of the Yates trial shows “how unsettled and unsettling narratives
from life are” and how many different views of a person can arise depending on
who holds the lens.567 As one scholar emphasizes, “it is not just who and what
we are that we want to get straight but who and what we might have been,
given the constraints that memory and culture impose on us.”568  It seems that
the legal system did not “get straight” the Andrea Yates story during the trial.
Maybe it will get it right when the case is appealed.
567. BRUNER, supra note 33, at 14.
568. Id.
